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WHY THE PRIOR CONVICTION 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS IN ILLEGAL 
RE-ENTRY CASES ARE UNJUST AND 
UNJUSTIFIED (AND UNREASONABLE TOO) 
Doug Keller* 
Abstract: This Article discusses an important federal sentencing issue that 
has received little scholarly attention, despite affecting thousands of lives 
each year: the harsh prior conviction sentencing enhancements that de-
fendants can receive in illegal re-entry cases—and only in illegal re-entry 
cases. The Sentencing Commission created the enhancement through a 
perfunctory process that radically altered illegal re-entry sentencing, shift-
ing the focus at sentencing from the illegal re-entry offense to the status 
of the defendant’s worst prior conviction. The result is a scheme where 
the length of the sentence many illegal re-entry defendants receive hinges 
on what they previously did—sometimes many years ago—rather than on 
the conduct for which they are ostensibly being prosecuted. Despite the 
unusual nature of the enhancement, the Commission has never provided 
a justification for it, nor is one apparent. Moreover, the enhancement 
undercuts Congress’s goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity 
and recommends sentences that are simply too harsh for illegal re-entry 
offenses. Although courts were previously powerless to do anything about 
the Commission’s indiscriminate decision making, that is no longer the 
case. Since the Supreme Court held in 2005 in United States v. Booker that 
the Guidelines are not mandatory, courts may now evaluate the sound-
ness of the Guidelines themselves before imposing a sentence. Even a 
cursory examination of the prior conviction enhancements shows that 
they are unsound and should not be followed. 
Introduction 
 Perhaps the most famous illegal re-entry defendant of all time is 
Hugo Roman Almendarez-Torres. He is the named defendant in Al-
mendarez-Torres v. United States, a 1998 case (cited tens of thousands of 
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times) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the fact of a prior 
conviction need not be alleged in the indictment in an illegal re-entry 
case, even though that fact raises the statutory maximum penalty.1 Al-
though the legal issue the case raised has been thoroughly dissected,2 
perhaps the most interesting issue the case presented—one not dis-
cussed by the Court or commentators—is how Mr. Almendarez-Torres 
received a sentence of over seven years for entering the country without 
permission after having been deported.3 A novice to federal sentencing 
might assume that this incident was not Mr. Almendarez-Torres’s first 
immigration conviction or that his offense involved violence, the poten-
tial for violence, or injury to someone. Indeed, given that a defendant 
can commit some rather serious federal crimes and receive a sentence 
of less than seven years—for example, distributing heroin,4 sexually 
abusing a minor under the age of 16,5 or providing over 1000 pounds 
of explosive materials to a known felon6—the novice might assume that 
Mr. Almendarez-Torres seriously hurt someone in the commission of 
his crime. But the way in which Mr. Almendarez-Torres committed his 
offense was no different than the way in which most people commit the 
offense of illegal re-entry: he crossed the U.S./Mexico border on foot 
                                                                                                                      
1 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998). 
2 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487–90 (2000) (discussing Almendarez-
Torres and observing that the approximately year-old opinion was arguably “incorrectly 
decided”); Amy Luria, Traditional Sentencing Factors v. Elements of an Offense: The Questionable 
Viability of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1229, 1233–38 (2005) 
(discussing Almendarez-Torres and its progeny); Brent E. Newton, Almendarez-Torres and the 
Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 747, 769–88 (2008) (discussing Almendarez-Torres 
and the ethical quandary it can put counsel in when deciding whether to preserve, for 
Supreme Court review, the issue of whether the decision was rightly decided, given that the 
Court itself has expressed doubts about its vitality). The case has garnered so much atten-
tion, in part, because Justice Thomas—who provided the fifth vote for the majority in Al-
mendarez-Torres—later decided that his vote was wrong. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520–21 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring) (explaining “one of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres” to which he 
“succumbed”); see also Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1202 (2006) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari, contending that the Court should 
address the vitality of Almendarez-Torres). 
3 Joint Appendix at *17aa, Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (No. 96-6839) (documenting 
that Mr. Almendarez-Torres received an eighty-five-month prison sentence). 
4 Compare U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (2009) (providing an offense 
level of 22 for a defendant convicted of selling between 60 and 80 grams of heroin), with 
id. § 2L1.2(a)–(b) (providing an offense level of 24 for a defendant convicted of illegal re-
entry who qualifies for the 16-level, prior conviction enhancement). 
5 Compare id. § 2A3.2(a) (providing an offense level of 18 for a defendant who is con-
victed of sexually abusing a minor), with id. § 2L1.2(a)–(b). 
6 Compare id. § 2K1.3(a)–(b) (providing an offense level of 17 for a defendant convicted 
of providing a known felon of over 1000 pounds of explosives), with id. § 2L1.2(a)–(b). 
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without violence or injury to anyone.7 What aggravated Mr. Almen-
darez-Torres’s illegal re-entry offense was that, four years earlier, he had 
been convicted of burglary in Texas, for which he had received a sen-
tence of approximately one year.8 That prior conviction, entirely unre-
lated to his illegal re-entry offense, increased his federal sentence by 
approximately six years,9 meaning he spent more time in federal prison 
because of his prior state conviction than he spent in state custody for 
that original offense by a factor of approximately six. There is no other 
federal crime Mr. Almendarez-Torres could have committed where a 
prior burglary conviction would have had a similar effect on his subse-
quent sentence. 
 For those unfamiliar with illegal re-entry sentencing, this result 
might seem perplexing. But something similar to this result occurs in 
thousands of federal cases each year. Defendants who re-enter illegally 
receive a sentence that is often doubled or tripled based on a prior 
conviction for which the defendant already served a sentence, possibly 
years or even decades ago. The conduct that placed the defendant be-
fore the sentencing judge to begin with—i.e., illegal re-entering—plays 
only a marginal role in the defendant’s sentencing fate. 
 This Article explains how the prior conviction enhancement be-
came the engine that drives illegal re-entry sentencing, why it never 
should have been promulgated, and what courts can and should do 
about it now. 
 Part I begins with some necessary historical context.10 For many 
years, district court judges had nearly unfettered sentencing discretion. 
Because of that fact, a widespread perception formed that a defendant’s 
sentence hinged almost entirely on the identity of the sentencing judge. 
Prompted, in part, by complaints about unwarranted sentencing dispar-
ity, Congress passed sentencing reform in the 1980s that led to the crea-
tion of the Sentencing Commission. Congress tasked the Commission 
with creating guidelines for categories of offenses and categories of de-
fendants, which would further the purposes of sentencing, including 
reducing unwarranted disparity. The Commission, in response, adopted 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at *13aa. 
8 See id. (observing that Mr. Almendarez-Torres was convicted of burglary in Dallas, 
Texas in March 1991 and was deported to Mexico in April 1992). 
9 See id. at *17aa (noting that Mr. Almendarez-Torres had an offense level of 21). This 
offense level would have been calculated by taking the base offense level of 8, subtracting 
three points for acceptance of responsibility, and adding in the 16-level increase for com-
mitting burglary. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2L1.2(a)–(b), 3E1.1(a). 
10 See infra notes 13–53 and accompanying text. 
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what it called a “modified real offense” approach to guidelines for cate-
gories of offenses. In accordance with this approach, the guideline 
range for a particular offense would differ based on specific characteris-
tics of the offense that the defendant committed. In a fraud case, for 
example, punishment would differ depending on the amount stolen. 
This approach differs from a charge-based system, where, for example, 
all fraud offenders could receive the same punishment, regardless of 
how much was stolen. In creating its offense guidelines, the Commission 
relied largely upon data gathered from a study of past sentencing prac-
tices to identify which offense characteristics to include in the offense 
guidelines. The Commission also created guidelines for calculating each 
defendant’s Criminal History Score, which it refined to address recidi-
vism concerns. Each defendant’s guideline range was located on a grid 
at the intersection of the offense guideline (based on characteristics of 
the present offense) and the criminal history score (based on prior 
criminal history). 
 Part II picks up the story after the creation of the original Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, following the evolution of the illegal re-entry Guideline 
provision, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.11 That Guideline was originally created 
without enhancements for prior convictions. Several years later, the 
Commission added a small enhancement for defendants who had pre-
viously committed a felony—any felony. Never before had the Commis-
sion used such an enhancement in an offense guideline. Despite the 
unique nature of the enhancement, the Commission never provided a 
justification for what it had done, thus turning its back on the thought-
ful process it engaged in while engineering the original Guidelines. 
This startling silence was a sign of things to come, as the Commission 
would revise the prior conviction enhancement several times without 
ever explaining its purpose or justifying the need for it. The Commis-
sion’s revisions would eventually result in a complicated structure in 
which a sentence can be increased by up to eight years based on a sin-
gle prior conviction. 
 Part III argues that courts should stop giving effect to the prior 
conviction scheme.12 The Part begins by pointing out that, since the 
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in 2005, district 
courts can no longer sentence defendants by mechanically calculating 
the Guideline range and then selecting a sentence within that range. 
Rather, district courts should evaluate the soundness of the Guideline 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 54–138 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 139–285 and accompanying text. 
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provisions themselves before exercising their own independent legal 
judgment regarding the appropriate sentence. Applying the lessons 
from the prior sections, Part III then evaluates the reasonableness of 
sentences that rely on the prior conviction enhancements. Given the 
endemic problems with the enhancement, any sentence that relies on 
such an enhancement will be unreasonable. This Part focuses on the 
enhancement’s three main shortcomings. 
• First, the enhancement has no apparent justification. Not only did 
the Commission fail to articulate a reason for the enhancement 
scheme, but potential justifications, such as the need to address re-
cidivism, fail to account for it. 
• Second, the enhancement scheme chips away at one of the pri-
mary goals of the Guidelines: to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparity. The structure of section 2L1.2 obliterates real offense 
sentencing for illegal re-entry cases, since defendants who have 
previously committed certain broad classes of crimes are all treated 
the same, regardless of the particular facts of the prior conviction. 
Further, wildly different prior convictions trigger the same sen-
tencing increase. 
• Third, even if a prior conviction scheme could be justified in the 
abstract, the scheme that the Commission selected results in Guide-
line ranges that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the of-
fense of illegal re-entry. Defendants who receive the harshest prior 
conviction enhancement receive a sentence that puts them on par 
with defendants who commit much more serious offenses, includ-
ing some terrorists. Moreover, illegal re-entry defendants often 
spend more time in federal prison because of their prior conviction 
than they did when convicted of committing that prior crime. 
Given these shortcomings of the prior conviction enhancement scheme, 
courts should exercise their newfound sentencing discretion to decline 
to apply the enhancement, even in the typical case. 
 The final Part concludes with some brief thoughts on where sen-
tencing in illegal re-entry cases should go from here. Unless and until 
the Commission acts, district courts should attempt to develop a sen-
tencing regime for illegal re-entry cases that results in fair, just, and rea-
sonable sentences. Regardless of what sort of scheme district courts rely 
on, however, the status quo is unacceptable. 
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I. The Genesis of the Sentencing Guidelines 
 Many law review articles13 and court decisions14 have told the story 
of the events leading to the creation of the Commission and the Guide-
lines. Rather than repeat what has been covered extensively elsewhere, 
the discussion below highlights some aspects of that story to provide 
relevant context to the current debate over the illegal re-entry Guide-
line. This context reveals two important lessons. First, one important 
goal of sentencing reform was to reduce unwarranted sentencing dis-
parity, and the Commission chose to reach that goal, in part, by prom-
ulgating guidelines that recommended different punishments for the 
same offense based on differences in the way the offense was commit-
ted.15 Second, according to the Commission, it created the original 
Guidelines only after careful study.16 
 The story of federal sentencing has a long first chapter. For two 
hundred years, federal district court judges had nearly unfettered dis-
cretion in sentencing criminal defendants.17 Congress set a statutory 
maximum for each crime, and federal judges were allowed to select a 
sentence up to that ceiling.18 As long as the judge did not select the 
sentence on a constitutionally impermissible basis (such as race or 
sex),19 the sentencing decision was virtually unreviewable.20 Empower-
                                                                                                                      
13 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 1–28 (1988); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal 
Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 291, 291–304 (1993); Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Troubling Silence About the Purpose of Punishment, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 1043, 
1049–56 (2003); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223, 223–81 (1993). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 294–303 (2005) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the history of Congress’s decision to create 
a mandatory guideline regime in the context of disagreeing with the majority’s holding 
that Congress would have preferred to institute advisory guidelines to remedy the Sixth 
Amendment problems with sentencings); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–70 
(1989) (discussing the creation of the Commission in the context of holding that the 
Guidelines neither violated the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine nor the 
separation-of-powers principle). 
15 See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 38–53 and accompanying text. 
17 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363; Stith & Koh, supra note 13, at 225–26. 
18 Stith & Koh, supra note 13, at 225. 
19 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (noting that “race, religion, or politi-
cal affiliation of the defendant” are “constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to 
the sentencing process”). 
20See, e.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986 (4th Cir. 1974) (“We disclaim the 
right to exercise general appellate review over sentences, but we do not doubt our authority 
to vacate and correct sentences imposed in violation of constitutional or statutory rights.”). 
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ing federal judges with so much discretion was justified on the basis 
that judges were in the best position to know the appropriate punish-
ment in an individual case.21 
 A perception developed that granting judges such wide discretion 
came with a rather large drawback: a defendant’s punishment would 
hinge on which judge happened to do the sentencing. A bank robber 
might receive a three-year sentence if sentenced by one judge; that 
same defendant might receive an eight-year sentence if sentenced in 
the courtroom next door.22 There were concerns that different sentenc-
ing outcomes resulted not only from judges’ differing sentencing phi-
losophies, but also on their subconscious biases and prejudices.23 
 In the 1980s, these concerns finally prompted Congress to over-
haul federal sentencing, and it passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.24 The Act created the Sentencing Commission and assigned to it 
the responsibility of developing a comprehensive guideline system to 
govern federal sentencing.25 The widely recognized primary goal of the 
guideline system was to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity.26 
 Congress directed the Commission to develop guidelines for cate-
gories of offenses and for categories of defendants.27 In developing 
guidelines for categories of offenses, Congress directed the Commis-
sion to take into account “the circumstances under which the offense 
was committed”28 and the “nature and degree of the harm caused by 
the offense,”29 and to “avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities 
                                                                                                                      
21 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363–64 (citing Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial 
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971)). 
22 As one commentator colorfully explained, it mattered whether the defendant ap-
peared at sentencing before “Hang-em Harry or Let-em-loose Lou.” Rappaport, supra note 
13, at 1051. 
23 See Stith & Koh, supra note 13, at 231 (cataloguing liberal concerns that “federal 
judges . . . favored white, middle-class offenders”); see also Breyer, supra note 13, at 5 (not-
ing some of the widespread sentencing disparities the Commission found with respect to 
the race and sex of the defendant). 
24 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.; 28 U.S.C.A §§ 991–998 (West 2008 & 2009 Supp.)). 
25 See 28 U.S.C.A §§ 991–998. 
26 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366; S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235 (“A primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of un-
warranted sentencing disparity.”); Breyer, supra note 13, at 4–5; Feinberg, supra note 13, at 
295–96. 
27 See 28 U.S.C.A § 991(b). 
28 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2) (2006). 
29 Id. § 994(c)(3). 
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among defendants . . . who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
conduct.”30 
 In response, the Commission adopted what it called a “modified 
real offense” approach to guidelines, under which the guideline range 
for a particular offense differed based on specific characteristics of the 
offense the defendant committed.31 A real-offense system can be con-
trasted with a charge-offense system, which tethers a defendant’s sen-
tence solely to the crime of conviction.32 A real-offense system dictates 
that not everyone charged with the same crime—say, bank robbery— 
would be sentenced as if they committed the same act.33 A defendant 
can rob a bank in a variety of ways, and not all bank robberies are equal. 
In practice, the real-offense guideline system would require judges to 
sentence defendants within a sentencing range based on the specific 
characteristics of the defendant’s present offense.34 For instance, a de-
fendant who committed a bank robbery (1) by stealing between $50,000 
and $100,000, (2) with a gun, and (3) injuring someone in the process 
would have this conduct translated into a guideline range (expressed in 
months), and a judge would have to select a sentence within that range. 
All defendants who committed a bank robbery under similar circum-
stances would therefore receive a similar sentence. 
 In developing the Guidelines, the Commission initially attempted 
to follow Congress’s command to make sure that the four fundamental 
goals of sentencing were met: “deterrence, incapacitation, just punish-
ment, and rehabilitation.”35 The Commission quickly recognized, how-
ever, that these vague, salutary goals often conflicted. Rather than pri-
oritizing one goal over another, the Commission attempted to side step 
the problem altogether by using historical sentencing practice as a 
guide: 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
31 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.4(a) (2009); Breyer, supra 
note 13, at 8–12; Stith & Koh, supra note 2, at 239 n.96 (“The Commission has, for the 
most part, adopted a ‘real offense’ approach . . . .”). 
32 See Breyer, supra note 13, at 8–12; William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant 
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 495 (1990) 
(“A major goal of the [Sentencing Reform] Act was to reduce disparity in sentencing 
through a new system in which defendants with similar characteristics who committed 
similar crimes received similar sentences.”). 
33 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.4(a) (2009). 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (setting forth the Commis-
sion’s purpose to assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing). 
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In its initial set of guidelines, the Commission sought to solve 
both the practical and philosophical problems of developing a 
coherent sentencing system by taking an empirical approach 
that used as a starting point data estimating pre-guidelines 
sentencing practice.36 
In other words, the Commission attempted to replicate past practice, 
with some notable exceptions.37 
 In so doing, the Commission used a wide range of information in 
an attempt to ensure that the initial batch of Guidelines was cooked 
just right: it analyzed data drawn from 10,000 presentence investiga-
tions, the differing elements of various crimes as distinguished in sub-
stantive criminal statutes, the U.S. Parole Commission’s guidelines and 
statistics, and data from other relevant sources to determine which dis-
tinctions were important in pre-Guidelines practice.38 
 After working for almost two years39—and “extensively debat[ing] 
which offender characteristics should make a difference in sentenc-
ing”40—the Commission crafted a Guideline regime that assigned a base 
offense level to nearly every federal crime.41 This level could increase 
based on aggravating circumstances relevant to the offense (i.e., specific 
offense characteristics).42 
 In addition to generating an adjusted offense level for each defen-
dant, the Commission also created, in chapter four of the Guidelines, a 
formula that would assign each defendant a Criminal History Score.43 
Although the Criminal History Score was adjusted to account for each 
of the “four purposes of sentencing,”44 it was “designed to predict re-
                                                                                                                      
36 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.3 (2009). 
37 See Breyer, supra note 13, at 15–21. Then-Judge Breyer, who played an integral role 
in the crafting of the Guidelines, explained that white collar cases was one area in which 
the Commission made a deliberate effort to deviate from past practice. See id. at 20–21. He 
also noted, however, that deviations from past practice “constitute[d] a fairly small part of 
the entire Guideline enterprise.” Id. at 23. There were other more drastic deviations, how-
ever, including drug trafficking, robbery, crimes against the person, and burglary. See U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines 
and Policy Statements 69 (1987). 
38 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, § 1.3 (2009). 
39 See Breyer, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that the Commission “worked from the 
time of its appointment on October 29, 1985, until April 13, 1987” in crafting the initial 
Guidelines). 
40 Id. at 19. 
41 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual chs. 2 & 3. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at ch. 4. 
44 Id. at ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
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cidivism.”45 Due to time constraints, the Commission did not develop 
the criminal history rules based on its own empirical research. Rather, 
it combined elements from the Parole Commission’s “Salient Factor 
Score” and the “Proposed Inslaw Scale,” both of which were designed 
to predict recidivism.46 
 Because the Criminal History Score was designed to address re-
cidivism concerns, the score excluded stale convictions, as such convic-
tions have no correlation to a defendant’s propensity to commit further 
crimes.47 According to later reports, “[t]esting of the guidelines’ crimi-
nal history [score] . . . shows that the aggregate Chapter Four provi-
sions are performing as intended and designed. . . . The empirical evi-
dence shows that criminal history as a risk measurement tool has statis-
tically significant power in distinguishing between recidivists and non-
recidivists.”48 
 The defendant’s guideline range is located on the Commission’s 
sentencing chart—a 258-box sentencing grid—based on the defen-
dant’s Criminal History Score (the horizontal axis) and the adjusted 
offense level (the vertical axis).49 A district court judge would need to 
select a sentence within the Guideline range generated from the 
chart,50 unless unusual circumstances warranted a departure.51 
 The Commission’s handiwork went into effect on November 1, 
1987.52 The Commission’s job, however, had only just begun, as it was 
expected to keep the Guidelines up to date, tweaking the provisions 
                                                                                                                      
45 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Com-
putation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 13 (2004). 
46 Id. at 1; see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, A Comparison of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Criminal History Category and the U.S. Parole Commission Sali-
ent Factor Score 3 (2005). 
47 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1 nn.1–3 (2009). 
48 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 45, at 15. 
49 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367 (observing that 
Congress settled “on a mandatory-guideline system” after considering “other competing 
proposals for sentencing reform,” including an advisory system). 
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and 
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
result in a sentence different from that described.”); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 94–96 (1996) (discussing when departures would be appropriate). 
52 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 
1987, 2031; see also United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,674, 
44,675 (1987) (“The [Sentencing Reform Act] requires the Commission to send its initial 
guidelines to Congress by April 13, 1987, and under the present statute they take effect 
automatically on November 1, 1987.”). 
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that did not work as intended or resulted in sentences that failed to sat-
isfy the goals of sentencing.53 
II. The History of the Illegal Re-Entry Guideline 
 The illegal re-entry Guideline provision, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, was 
forged during the process that gave birth to the original Guidelines. 
The original Guideline, based on the Commission’s past-practice study, 
had no special enhancements for defendants with certain types of prior 
convictions.54 Over time, however, the Commission radically changed 
the guideline for illegal re-entry, adding a series of harsh prior convic-
tion enhancements that can triple a defendant’s offense level and result 
in a much longer sentence.55 The Commission, however, never ex-
plained the purpose of this dramatic shift in sentencing philosophy. 
 The modern crime of illegal re-entry was created in 1952, when 
Congress made it a felony, punishable by up to two years in prison, for 
someone to enter the United States after having been deported unless 
the person had received permission to re-enter from the appropriate 
authorities.56 Although illegal re-entry was a crime before 1952, a patch-
work of laws had governed the offense before then.57 
 When the Guidelines went into effect in 1987, the Commission 
drafted section 2L1.2 to cover illegal entry and illegal re-entry, assigning 
                                                                                                                      
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006) (“The Commission periodically shall review and revise, 
in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promul-
gated pursuant to the provisions of this section. In fulfilling its duties and in exercising its 
powers, the Commission shall consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional 
representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system.”); Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) (pointing out that the Commission’s work to ensure that 
the Guidelines meet the goals of sentencing is “ongoing”). 
54 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 (1987). 
55 See id. at app. C, amend. 38 (1988); id. at app. C, amend. 193 (1989). 
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). 
57 See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 835 (1987). The Court noted: 
Before § 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections imposed criminal penal-
ties upon aliens who reentered the country after deportation: 8 U.S.C. 
§ 180(a) (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that any alien who had 
been “deported in pursuance of law” and subsequently entered the United 
States would be guilty of a felony; 8 U.S.C. § 138 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), 
which provided that an alien deported for prostitution, procuring, or similar 
immoral activity, and who thereafter reentered the United States, would be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty; and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 137–7(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1952), which stated that any alien 
who reentered the country after being deported for subversive activity would 
be guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third, more severe penalty. 
Id. at 835. 
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both crimes a base offense level of 6.58 To provide a harsher punish-
ment for defendants who had illegally re-entered, all such defendants 
received a two-level increase for having been deported before.59 As a 
result, the “original immigration guidelines did not deviate substantially 
from past practice”60—in conformity with the Commission’s general 
goal61—and defendants who committed an immigration offense, in-
cluding illegal re-entry, served an average of fifteen months in prison.62 
 A year after the Guidelines went into effect, the Commission re-
moved the crime of illegal entry from section 2L1.2.63 To consolidate 
the remainder of that Guideline provision, the Commission changed 
the base offense level for illegal re-entry from 6 to 8 and eliminated the 
two-level increase for a prior deportation.64 That is where the base of-
fense level remains to this day. 
 The next year, in 1989, the Commission altered the illegal re-entry 
Guideline—and it did so in a fundamental and unprecedented way. 
The Commission first added a four-level increase for defendants who 
had been deported following a conviction for a “felony” not involving a 
violation of immigration laws.65 Never before had the Commission re-
quired an offense level increase because of a single prior conviction 
different from the present offense. Indeed, it appears that the only 
other place the Commission had included any sort of prior conviction 
enhancement was in the alien smuggling Guideline, which included a 
two-level increase for defendants who had previously committed the 
same offense.66 
                                                                                                                      
58 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(a) (1987). According to the Com-
mission’s past-practice study, defendants who were convicted of illegal entry before the 
Guidelines (not including defendants who received probation) served the equivalent in 
months of an offense level 6 (0–15 months imposed), and those convicted of illegal re-entry 
served the equivalent in months of an offense level 7 (0–21 months imposed). See U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n, supra note 37, at 34. The average time served for all immigration offend-
ers, including those sentenced to probation, was 5.7 months. Id. at 69. 
59 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1) (1987) (“If the defendant 
previously has unlawfully entered or remained in the United States, increase by 2 levels.”). 
60 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing 65 (2004). 
61 See Breyer, supra note 13, at 17–18. 
62 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 60, at 64–65. 
63 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 38 (1988). 
64 See id. 
65 Id. at app. C, amend. 193 (1989). The Commission also encouraged an upward de-
parture for defendants with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony or a violent felony. 
See id. 
66 See id. § 2L1.1(a)(2) (1989) (“If the defendant previously has been convicted of smug-
gling, transporting, or harboring an unlawful alien, or a related offense, increase by 2 levels.”). 
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 The Commission thus blessed the “double counting” of a prior 
conviction. A single conviction would first lengthen a defendant’s sen-
tence by increasing the defendant’s Criminal History Score; it would 
then raise it again by increasing the offense level. Many judges have 
wondered aloud about the wisdom of this practice; as one federal judge 
put it, while “it is sound policy to increase a defendant’s sentence based 
on his prior record, it is questionable whether a sentence should be 
increased twice on that basis.”67 
 The Commission did not explain why this sort of double counting 
was appropriate, nor did it explain how it determined that chapter 
four—which is said to reflect not only the risk of recidivism but general 
deterrence needs and retribution—did not adequately account for a 
defendant’s criminal history in illegal re-entry cases and only in illegal 
re-entry cases. Instead of providing an explanation, the Commission’s 
official Reason for Amendment simply documents what it did: “This 
specific offense characteristic is in addition to, and not in lieu of, 
criminal history points added for the prior sentence.”68 
 A second notable aspect of the Commission’s four-level increase 
was that a conviction could qualify for the enhancement regardless of its 
age, as the promulgated Guideline contained (and to this day contains) 
no temporal limitation.69 Thus, unlike when calculating a defendant’s 
Criminal History Score, even ancient convictions count for purposes of 
the enhancement.70 The Commission, however, never explained why a 
time limitation was appropriate for criminal history score purposes but 
not for section 2L1.2. 
 Although the Commission was silent as to why it added a “specific 
offense characteristic” for prior convictions, it was likely related to 
Congress’s decision the year before to increase the statutory maximum 
penalty for illegal re-entry for defendants who had certain qualifying 
prior convictions. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress in-
creased the statutory maximum for illegal re-entry from two to five 
years if the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony and to 
fifteen years if the defendant had previously been convicted of an “ag-
gravated felony,”71 defined as “murder, any drug trafficking crime,” traf-
                                                                                                                      
67 United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963 (E.D. Wis. 2005), quoted in 
United States v. Carballo-Arguelles, 446 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
68 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 193 (1989). 
69 See United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 484 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007). 
70 See id. 
71 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1326 (2006)). Aggravated felony is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Congress 
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ficking in firearms or other destructive devices, and any attempt or 
conspiracy to commit these offenses.72 The legislative history of these 
amendments sheds some insight on Congress’s thought process. When 
Senator Chiles of Florida introduced the bill containing these amend-
ments, he referred to “felons . . . involved in an array of illegal enter-
prises including drug trafficking, money laundering, fraudulent credit 
cards rings, racketeering, weapon sales, and prostitution.”73 He invoked 
“expansive drug syndicates established and managed by illegal aliens.”74 
He also gave an example of an individual who should be prosecuted 
under these stricter penalties: “[A] Columbian . . . [who was] deported 
previously from the United States and . . . is linked with 50 drug related 
murders and is currently the subject of 6 drug killings in the New Or-
leans area and a series of drug killings in California.”75 
 Before this statutory change, it would not have made much sense 
to have enhancements for illegal re-entry cases, because any enhance-
ment would have pushed a defendant’s Guideline range past the two-
year statutory maximum. With that statutory cap lifted, the Commis-
sion was free to add specific offense characteristics to distinguish be-
tween aggravated and non-aggravated illegal re-entry cases. Although it 
was perhaps understandable for the Commission to want to add some 
sort of enhancement scheme, the scheme the Commission chose was 
not inevitable. For example, the Commission could have chosen to add 
an enhancement for defendants who had been previously deported 
more than once, because such defendants had continually flaunted our 
immigration laws. Such defendants would be good candidates for en-
hancements because they had not been deterred from returning to this 
country. That type of enhancement would have been consistent with 
the original version of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which distinguished between a 
defendant who had never been deported and a defendant who had 
previously been deported. Or the Commission could have looked to 
the legislative history of the amendment, done independent research, 
and decided to limit any enhancement to reflect what Congress ap-
peared most concerned with: the individual who returns to the United 
                                                                                                                      
would later increase the statutory maximum—again without explanation—to ten or twenty 
years, depending on the nature of the prior conviction. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001 
(1994). 
72 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)). 
73 133 Cong. Rec. S4992-01 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Chiles). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
2010] Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases 733 
States after deportation with the specific purpose of continuing crimi-
nal activities. Rather than use a narrow enhancement scheme with such 
a basis, the Commission instead selected a scheme that had no pedi-
gree, that research did not support, and that was a sharp break from 
the enhancements in the rest of the Guidelines—enhancements that 
generally reflected some fact about the offense for which the defendant 
was being sentenced. 
 Presumably, the Commission chose an enhancement scheme that 
reflected Congress’s decision to tether the increase in the statutory 
maximum to the nature of a defendant’s prior conviction, but Congress 
did not direct the Commission to follow its lead with a new prior con-
viction enhancement scheme. This, despite the fact that Congress has, 
at times, ordered the Commission to add a particular enhancement.76 
Moreover, legislative history regarding Congress’s purpose suggests that 
it had a particular kind of offender in mind for increased punish-
ment.77 Indeed, the Commission’s decision mirrors its much criticized 
judgment to craft drug offense Guidelines by replicating the weight-
driven scheme Congress had created for its mandatory minimum pen-
alties for drug offenses.78 In crafting such a regime, the Commission 
cast aside its sentencing expertise and created Guidelines without using 
any sort of empirical approach.79 
 Two more years passed before the Commission once again altered 
the Guideline provision for illegal re-entry. And it once again did so in 
                                                                                                                      
76 See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
77 See id. 
78 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S 85, 96 (2007) (“The Commission did not use 
this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking offenses. 
Instead, it employed the [Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986’s] weight-driven scheme.”); Lynn 
Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Improving the Guidelines Through Critical Evaluation: An Important New 
Role for District Courts, 57 Drake L. Rev. 575, 582–83 (2009) (pointing out that the Commis-
sion blindly adopted Congress’s weight-based approach, used in crafting mandatory mini-
mum statutes, for its drug guidelines). Several scholars have criticized the Commission’s 
weight-driven drug guidelines. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Booker on Crack: Sentencing’s 
Latest Gordian Knot, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 551, 559 (2006) (“The guidelines’ ap-
proach to drug sentencing in general has been the subject of harsh criticism for several rea-
sons, including their perceived excessive severity and their primary focus on the weight of the 
drugs involved as a proxy for culpability and as a justification for longer sentences.” (internal 
footnotes omitted)); see also Douglas A. Berman, The Second Circuit: Attributing Drug Quantities 
to Narcotics Offenders, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 247, 251 (1994) (“[T]he connection between actual 
drug amounts and a defendant’s culpability is often tenuous at best.”); Jon O. Newman, Five 
Guideline Improvements, 5 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 190, 190 (1993) (arguing that the drug-weight 
system should be replaced with a regime that will “correlate drug sentences primarily with 
the defendant’s role in the drug distribution system”). 
79 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96. 
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an unprecedented way.80 The 1991 Guideline amendments included a 
reshaping of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 such that it mandated a draconian 16-
level increase for defendants who had been deported after a conviction 
for an “aggravated felony,” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).81 Thus, 
defendants who had previously been convicted of an aggravated felony 
saw their offense level triple, from 8 to 24, and their sentence length 
increase “anywhere from five to fourteen times.”82 The Commission 
required this stunningly severe offense level increase with no justifica-
tion—reasoned or otherwise: 
The Commission did no study to determine if such sentences 
were necessary—or desirable from any penal theory. Indeed, 
no research supports such a drastic upheaval. No Commission 
studies recommended such a high level, nor did any other 
known ground warrant it. Commissioner Michael Gelacak 
suggested the 16-level increase and the Commission passed it 
with relatively little discussion.83 
                                                                                                                      
80 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 375 (1991). 
81 Id. 
82 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 78, at 589. 
83 Robert J. McWhirter & Jon M. Sands, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Defense Per-
spective on Sentencing in Aggravated Felony Re-entry Cases, 8 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 275, 276 (1996). 
McWhirter and Sands went on to note that the “16-level adjustment is unlike any in the 
guidelines. There is neither a gradual increase in severity of the offenses, such as in drug 
or fraud crimes, nor is the increase pegged to a more serious element in the offense itself.” 
Id. at 275; see also Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 30 (Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Hearing] (testimony of Maureen 
Franco) (“No empirical study or policy analysis was conducted to justify the 16-level en-
hancement.”). The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) urged the Commission to adopt a 20-
level enhancement, indicating that it considered such an enhancement necessary “to re-
flect the substantial increase in the maximum penalties in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988” for illegal reentry after deportation subsequent to a felony conviction. Public Hearing 
Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 7 (Mar. 5, 
1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearing] (statement Joe B. Brown, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). As the 
DOJ put it, “[a]n increased penalty of this magnitude—two years to 15 years—and limited 
to particularly defined offenses must, in our view, be reflected in the sentencing guidelines 
if the will of Congress is to be effectuated.” Id. at 8. The Department acknowledged that a 
20-level increase would be “steep,” but that it would not be too harsh: “In the ordinary 
case, an alien drug dealer who illegally returns to the United States to practice his trade will 
continue this pattern of conduct until there is a substantial disincentive to do so.” Id. (em-
phasis added). It went on to suggest that “in the exceptional situation involving an illegal 
alien drug dealer who has some sympathetic reason to reside here illegally, the court may 
depart downward.” Id. In other words, if the alien did not return to commit crimes, the 
enhanced sentence would be greater than necessary to achieve just punishment. Thus, the 
Department viewed the enhancement as one that should apply only to those who return to 
continue their illegal activity. 
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Such perfunctory decision-making stands in stark contrast to the proc-
ess envisioned in the Sentencing Reform Act, or the process the Com-
mission used to create the original version of the Guidelines. It was also 
even further divorced from Congress’s purpose for increasing the statu-
tory maximum in the first place. 
 Perfunctory or not, the result of the Commission’s amendment 
was nothing short of a complete overhaul in the sentencing of illegal re-
entry cases. The focus of sentencing in such cases suddenly shifted 
from the facts of the defendant’s illegal re-entry (which now had only 
marginal relevance to the sentencing outcome) to the defendant’s 
prior convictions. Put in concrete terms, as a result of the Commission’s 
amendment, a defendant convicted of illegal re-entry who had previ-
ously committed an aggravated felony could see the Guideline range 
span from between four and five years to eight and ten years, depend-
ing on the defendant’s Criminal History Score.84 Prior to the amend-
ment, the same defendant would have received a sentence between one 
and three years.85 
 That same year, the Commission also created the only other en-
hancement that is even remotely similar to its illegal re-entry prior con-
viction enhancement: a prior conviction enhancement for firearm and 
explosive offenses.86 This enhancement, however, was substantially nar-
rower. Instead of covering the broad category of crimes that could be 
categorized as “aggravated felonies,” the enhancement would be trig-
gered only if the defendant had previously committed a “controlled 
substance offense” or “crime of violence.”87 This latter term covers of-
fenses that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against [another]” or offenses that are “burglary 
of a dwelling, arson, extortion, involve[] use of explosives, or otherwise 
involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical in-
jury to another.”88 If the defendant has previously committed one quali-
fying offense, the defendant’s offense level can increase by up to 8 (to 
                                                                                                                      
84 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 375 (1991). 
85 See id. § 2L1.2(a). 
86 See id. app. C, amend. 373 (amending U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3, the explosive materials 
guideline provision, to include prior conviction enhancements); id. at app. C, amend. 374 
(amending U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, the firearms guideline provision, to include prior conviction 
enhancements). 
87 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K1.3(a)(1), (2) (2009) (prior conviction 
enhancement for explosive material offenses); id. § 2K2.1(a)(1)–(4) (prior conviction en-
hancement for firearm offenses). 
88 Id. § 4B1.2(a). Both § 2K1.3 and § 2K2.1 adopt this definition. See id. § 2K1.3 n.2; id. 
§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. 
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an offense level of 20); if the defendant has committed two qualifying 
offenses, the defendant’s offense level can increase by up to 12 (to an 
offense level of 24).89 That means a defendant who commits a firearms 
or explosives offense can have committed two prior qualifying convic-
tions and still receive less of an increase in his sentence than an illegal 
re-entry defendant who commits one such offense.90 A 16-level increase 
is never possible for a firearms or explosives offense.91 The enhance-
ment is also not triggered if the prior conviction is too stale to score for 
criminal history purposes.92 The Commission, unfortunately, has never 
explained why it created a much narrower prior conviction enhance-
ment for firearm/explosives offenses than it did for illegal re-entry of-
fenses. 
 During the next year, in 1992, a notable (but often unnoticed) de-
velopment in the world of prior conviction enhancements occurred. 
Recall that, in the original Guidelines, the Commission had created a 
two-level increase for defendants in alien smuggling cases who had pre-
viously committed the same offense.93 According to the Commission, 
the enhancement had been created because it served as a proxy for 
defendants who were involved in “ongoing criminal conduct.”94 In 
1992, however, the Commission decided to remove it after “further 
study” convinced it that the enhancement was “not a good proxy for 
such conduct.”95 The Commission also noted that “the inclusion of a 
prior criminal record variable in the offense guideline is inconsistent 
with the general treatment of prior record as a separate dimension in 
the guidelines.”96 Thus, the Commission recognized the tension that its 
prior conviction enhancement had created with the Criminal History 
Score—and the dubiousness of the practice of double counting—and 
eliminated it for alien smuggling cases. But the Commission did not 
explain why the practice made sense in the context of illegal re-entry 
cases. In any event, the Commission’s attempt at consistency in the 
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. § 2K1.3(a)(1),(2) (prior conviction enhancement for explosive material of-
fenses); id. § 2K2.1(a)(1)–(4) (prior conviction enhancement for firearm offenses). 
90 See id. § 2K2.1(a)(2), (a)(4)(A); id. § 2K1.3(a)(1), (2). 
91 See id. § 2K2.1(a)(2), (a)(4)(A); id. § 2K1.3(a)(1), (2). 
92 See id. §§ 2K1.3 cmt. n.2, 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (noting that only prior convictions that 
score for purposes of calculating a defendant’s Criminal History Score can qualify as a 
triggering conviction). 
93 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.1(a)(2) (1989) (“If the defendant pre-
viously has been convicted of smuggling, transporting, or harboring an unlawful alien, or a 
related offense, increase by 2 levels.”). 
94 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 450 (1992). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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alien smuggling context did not last long. In 1996, Congress ordered 
the Commission to include a sentencing enhancement for defendants 
in alien smuggling cases who had previously committed one or two 
prior offenses involving the same or similar conduct.97 The Commis-
sion dutifully complied.98 
 Despite the radical path the Commission took with respect to ille-
gal re-entry sentencing, the amendments did not have an immediate 
impact, given the small number of illegal re-entry cases brought in the 
early 1990s.99 For example, in 1992, only 652 defendants were sen-
tenced for illegal re-entry,100 making up less than 2% of the federal 
criminal docket.101 And of those defendants, an even smaller number 
received a prior conviction enhancement, though exact numbers are 
not available. Thus, the prior conviction enhancements, and particu-
larly the new 16-level enhancement, affected only a small fraction of 
total cases, perhaps allowing it to go relatively unnoticed. 
 That all changed over the ensuing decade. Starting in the mid-
1990s, prosecutions for illegal re-entry exploded, resulting in 1528 sen-
tencings for illegal re-entry in 1995 and 6191 in 2000, nearly 20% of the 
federal criminal docket.102 The Commission’s prior conviction scheme 
was at issue in a growing number of cases. Sentence length for illegal 
re-entry also reached new heights, as the average sentence imposed 
increased to a staggering three years by 2000, more than double what it 
had been a decade before.103 
 With the increase in the number of cases and sentence length 
came complaints. As the Commission reported, “a number of judges, 
probation officers, and defense attorneys, particularly in districts along 
the southwest border between the United States and Mexico,” had 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-208, § 203(e), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-566, 3009-567 (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1324 (2006)). 
98 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 543 (1997). 
99 See Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Followed?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 7 (2000) (statement of John R. Streer, Vice-Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n). 
100 Id. at exhibit 8. 
101 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Changing Face of Federal Criminal Sentencing 
1, tbl.1 (2008) (documenting that 38,258 defendants were sentenced in 1992). 
102 See  Oversight of the United States Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Fol-
lowed?, supra note 99, at exhibit 8 (statement of John R. Streer, Vice-Chair, U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n) (noting that there were 1528 illegal re-entry sentencings in 1995); U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n, 2000 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.50 (stating 
that there were 6191 illegal re-entry sentencings during 2000); id. at 11, fig.A (noting that 
immigration cases counted for 19.9% of total cases). 
103 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 102, at tbl.50. 
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criticized the 16-level enhancement, pointing out that it resulted in 
“disproportionate penalties.”104 The Commission also held meetings 
with judges from the Fifth Circuit about the illegal re-entry Guideline. 
A core belief emanated from the meetings: The definition of 
a ‘prior aggravated felony’ was too broad and captured many 
relatively minor offenses. . . . The judges believed that a good 
number of these prior aggravated felonies were nonviolent, 
and often were motivated by family separation circumstances 
rather than sinister criminal intentions.105 
The Commission’s research supported the judges’ experience, docu-
menting that over half the time the conviction that triggered a defen-
dant’s 16-level increase did not involve violence, injury, or a weapon.106 
Judges also noted that the severity of the penalty led to “inventive charg-
ing practices” and “distinctive judicial practices,” both of which varied by 
district, to mitigate the unwarranted harshness of the guideline.107 
 In response to the criticism, the Commission set out to study how it 
could more effectively tether the seriousness of a prior conviction to the 
amount it increased the defendant’s offense level.108 Disappointingly, 
the Commission apparently started from the premise that its prior con-
viction scheme was justified and that it only needed to further refine the 
enhancement so that the 16-level increase was triggered in a smaller 
percentage of cases.109 The Commission apparently never seriously con-
sidered abandoning the 16-level increase and never sought to ground 
the prior conviction enhancements in any sort of penal theory.110 
 According to an article written by a Commission researcher, the 
Commission considered re-working its prior conviction scheme to “link 
the enhancement level [increase] to a ‘time served’ indicator of [prior] 
offense severity.”111 The proposed amendment required (with some 
exceptions) a 16-level increase for defendants who had served at least 
                                                                                                                      
104 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 632 (2001). 
105 Linda Drazga Maxfield, Aggravated Felonies and § 2L1.2 Immigration Unlawful Reentry 
Offenders: Simulating the Impacts of Proposed Guideline Amendments, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
527, 530 (2003). 
106 See id. at 532. 
107 Id. at 531. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. (discussing how the Commission wished to fix what it thought was a broken 
system without ever mentioning whether the Commission considered dropping its prior 
conviction scheme altogether). 
110 See id. 
111 Maxfield, supra note 105, at 531. 
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ten years on a prior aggravated felony; a 10- or 12-level increase for de-
fendants who had served between five and ten years; an 8-level increase 
for defendants who had served between two and five years; and a 6-level 
increase for defendants who had served less than two years.112 The pub-
lic comments on the proposal were “positive.”113 After running simula-
tions, however, the “consensus reaction” among the commissioners was 
that the result of this proposal was “too generous,” i.e., not enough de-
fendants with convictions for what the Commission considered to be 
serious crimes would receive the 16-level increase.114 The Commission 
looked at simulations with shorter “time-served” break points, but con-
cluded that the “time-served” strategy failed to distinguish sufficiently 
between serious and less serious prior convictions and that there were 
too many practical problems involved in setting up such a system.115 
 Once the Commission abandoned the time-served proposal, it de-
cided to reclassify “aggravated felonies” as requiring an eight-level in-
crease.116 It also decided to retain the 16-level enhancement for the fol-
lowing broad categories of felonies: 
• Drug trafficking offenses;117 
• Crimes of violence118 (defined as murder, manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including sexual 
abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension 
of credit, and burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense that has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against another person);119 
                                                                                                                      
112 See id. at 533. 
113 Id. at 537. 
114 Id. at 535. 
115 Id. at 535–36. Scrapping a time-served model based on practical concerns seems a 
bit peculiar, because the Guidelines require a proper understanding of how much time a 
defendant served on a prior sentence in other contexts. For example, a defendant receives 
three criminal history points for each prior conviction that was accompanied by a sentence 
served exceeding one year and one month. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 4A1.1(a) (2009). Any prior conviction for which the defendant served less than thirteen 
months but more than sixty days triggers a two-point increase in the defendant’s Criminal 
History Score. See id. § 4A1.1(b). 
116 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 632 (2001). 
117 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i); see also id. § 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iv) (defining drug trafficking 
offense). 
118 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
119 See id. § 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii). This broad definition of crime of violence covers 
many more offenses than the definition of “crime of violence” provided for firearms and 
explosives offenses. See id. §§ 2K1.3 cmt. 2, 2K2.1 cmt. 1. 
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• Firearm offenses;120 
• Child pornography offenses;121 
• National security or terrorism offenses;122 
• Human trafficking offenses;123 and 
• Alien smuggling offenses committed for profit.124 
 The amendment also further expanded the reach of the 16-level 
increase such that the enhancement could apply if the triggering crime 
could have resulted in punishment of at least a year in jail—before, the 
enhancement would apply only if the defendant had served at least one 
year.125 The lone exception to this rule applies to drug trafficking of-
fenses, as the defendant must have served at least thirteen months to 
qualify for the 16-level increase; a shorter sentence, however, still results 
in a 12-level increase.126 
 The Commission again declined to provide any justification for its 
enhancement scheme or explain why it made sense to single out illegal 
re-entry cases for harsh enhancements for prior convictions.127 The 
Commission also continued to leave out a time-limit provision that 
would disqualify stale convictions. 
 Since 2001, the Commission has tinkered with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2,128 
but the essential structure of the provision has remained the same. The 
Commission has held hearings on the Guideline, soliciting feedback 
from judges, probation officers, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
                                                                                                                      
120 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(iii); see also id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(v) (defining firearm of-
fense). 
121 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(iv) (2009); see also id. 
§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) (defining child pornography offense). 
122 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(v) (2001); see also id. 
§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(viii) (defining terrorism offense). 
123 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vi); see also id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vi) (defining human traf-
ficking offense). 
124 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii); see also id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(i) (defining alien smug-
gling offense). 
125 See id. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.2 (defining felony as “any federal, state, or local offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (emphasis added)); see also United 
States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that an aggra-
vated felony—which would now only trigger an 8-level increase—only included crimes in 
which the defendant had been punished by one year, whereas felonies triggering the 16-
level increase were crimes in which the defendant could be punished by at least a year). 
126 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), (B). 
127 See id. at app. C, amend. 632 (2001). 
128 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 722 (2008) (alter-
ing the definition of “forcible sex offenses”). 
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and defense lawyers.129 At these hearings, the DOJ has advocated re-
placing the current prior conviction enhancement that depends on the 
identity of the prior crime with a time-served model, similar to the one 
the Commission rejected in 2001.130 The DOJ’s concerns with the cur-
rent system, however, are not that it is too harsh, as it wants a time-
served system to be sentence-neutral, meaning average sentence 
lengths would remain the same.131 Its concerns instead center on the 
complexity of the present system—complexity that exists mostly be-
cause it is often difficult to determine whether a defendant’s prior con-
viction falls under one of the generic crimes listed in the Guidelines, 
resulting in significant litigation.132 Defense attorneys, for their part, 
have lodged a series of complaints against the current scheme, often 
pointing out to the Commission that the current system has no an-
nounced justification.133 Nevertheless, the Commission has chosen to 
remain silent on the scheme’s purpose and seems disinclined to rework 
the enhancement in any sort of fundamental way. 
 Since the 2001 amendment, the number of defendants sentenced 
for illegal re-entry has continued to rise. In 2008, there were 13,575 
such defendants,134 which means that approximately one in six federal 
sentencings during 2008 were for illegal re-entry cases.135 More cases 
coupled with longer sentences have resulted in enormous monetary 
costs, as taxpayers must expend about $25,000 per year to house a fed-
eral prisoner.136 Thus, to use 2008 as an example, the government will 
spend approximately $600 million in housing costs for illegal re-entry 
                                                                                                                      
129 See generally 2008 Hearing, supra note 83; Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, San Diego, Cal., U.S. Sentencing Commission (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 
Hearing]. 
130 See 2008 Hearing, supra note 83, at 20–22 (testimony of Diane J. Humetewa, U.S. At-
torney, Dist. of Ariz.). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See, e.g., 2006 Hearing, supra note 129, at 22 (testimony of Comm’r Ruben Castillo) 
(“When we were out in Texas, the Federal Defenders gave some, I thought, compelling 
testimony that said, in the first instance, the Commission has never articulated a justifica-
tion for the 16-level enhancement.”). 
134 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 102, at tbl.50 (noting that there were 13,575 
illegal re-entry sentencings during 2008). 
135 See id. at tbl.13 (noting that there were 76,366 sentencings during 2008). That trend 
has continued under President Obama, as prosecutions for illegal re-entry increased almost 
40% during the first ten months of his tenure. See TRAC Immigration, Immigration Prosecu-
tions at Record Levels in FY 2009, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/ (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2010). 
136 See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,853, 
33,853 (2008). 
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defendants sentenced during that year.137 Increased prosecutions also 
result in enormous social costs—families are separated and children 
(citizen and non-citizen alike) are forced to grow up in broken homes 
or without a home, increasing the chance that they themselves commit 
crimes.138 The Commission, however, has failed to do a single study on 
whether these enormous economic and moral costs are worth bearing. 
III. Courts Should Reject the Prior Conviction Enhancement 
 With an overview of the current illegal re-entry Guideline in mind, 
this Part explains how and why courts should reject the prior conviction 
enhancement. The first subsection below explains how district courts 
are now empowered to reject the enhancement.139 The framework 
finds its roots in the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. 
Booker, where the Court held that the Guidelines are advisory—just one 
factor among several for district courts to consider at sentencing.140 As 
a result of that decision, district courts must consider arguments, if 
raised, that the Guideline itself was not developed through careful 
study and therefore fails to reflect the purposes of sentencing. Appel-
late courts may find that reliance on such a guideline is unreasonable. 
The second subsection answers why sentencing courts should reject the 
prior conviction enhancement.141 In nearly every case, the prior convic-
tion enhancement fails to serve the congressionally mandated goals of 
sentencing properly. That is so because the enhancement (1) has no 
justification; (2) fosters unwarranted sentencing disparity; and (3) re-
sults in a disproportionate penalty. 
A. New Discretion in Applying the Guidelines 
 Throughout the mandatory Guidelines era, complaints that a 
given Guideline provision was unfair, unreasonable, or served no pur-
                                                                                                                      
137 In 2008, 13,575 illegal re-entry defendants received an average sentence of 22.6 
months. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 102, at tbl.50. That means illegal re-entry 
defendants received, in the aggregate, 25,566.25 years of prison. According to the DOJ, it 
costs $24,922 a year to house a federal prisoner. Annual Determination of Average Cost of 
Incarceration, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,853. That means it will cost $637,162,082.50 to house 
those prisoners. 
138 See, e.g., Joseph Murray et al., Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Child 
Antisocial Behaviour and Mental Health: A Systematic Review 56 (2009); Jeremy 
Travis, Families and Children, 69 Fed. Probation 31, 38 (2005). 
139 See infra notes 142–164 and accompanying text. 
140 See 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005). 
141 See infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text. 
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pose had to be directed to the Commission or Congress. Complaints 
directed to the district court at sentencing were to no avail. Sentencing 
judges could not impose a below-Guideline sentence just because, in 
their judgment, the Guideline provision at issue was defective.142 
Rather, the court was required to sentence the defendant within the 
Guideline range unless extraordinary circumstances required another 
result.143 A court’s judgment that the Guideline provision reflected un-
sound policy was not enough.144 
 That changed in 2005 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, 
where the Court held that the mandatory Guideline regime violated 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to be sentenced based on facts 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defen-
dant.145 To cure the constitutional shortcomings of the Guidelines, the 
Court excised the portions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made 
them mandatory.146 The surgery rendered the Guidelines advisory and 
required district courts to “consider” the Guideline range as one of sev-
eral statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in selecting a sen-
tence.147 Thus, district courts no longer need to impose a within-
Guideline sentence. Instead, they must select a sentence below the statu-
tory maximum (and above or at the statutory minimum, if there is one) 
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the four 
traditional goals of sentencing set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).148 
 The Supreme Court has also clarified that—to ensure that the 
Guidelines are not treated as mandatory—sentencing judges may con-
sider arguments that a below-Guideline sentence is appropriate because 
the “Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553 considera-
tions,”149 that “the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment,”150 or that 
                                                                                                                      
142 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and 
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should re-
sult in a sentence different from that described.”). 
143 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996) (discussing when departures 
would be appropriate). 
144 See id. 
145 See 543 U.S. at 243–44. 
146 See id. at 245. 
147 Id. 
148 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007) (listing the four traditional goals 
of sentencing: “(a) ‘just punishment’ (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) 
rehabilitation”). 
149 Id. at 351. 
150 Id. at 357. 
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they “do not generally treat certain defendant characteristics in the 
proper way.”151 As the Court described in its 2007 decision in Rita v. 
United States, the Guidelines were developed based on the Commission’s 
study of empirical evidence of thousands of pre-Guidelines sentences, 
and the Commission also may revise its Guidelines based on data and 
consultation with judges, practitioners, and experts in the field.152 If a 
particular Guideline was developed in this manner, it is “fair to assume” 
that it “reflect[s] a rough approximation of sentences that might 
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”153 The Court reiterated in 2007 in Gall v. 
United States that the Guidelines were generally “the product of careful 
study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of 
thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”154 The Court recognized, 
however, that “not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evi-
dence.”155 
 Applying these principles in Kimbrough v. United States in 2007, the 
Supreme Court—in the course of holding that a district court may dis-
agree with the Commission’s judgment that 1 gram of crack cocaine 
should be punished as severely as 100 grams of powder cocaine— ob-
served that judges may disagree with Guidelines that are not the prod-
uct of “empirical data and national experience,” and thus “do not ex-
emplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role.”156 The Court confirmed that a district court may vary from a 
Guideline range based on a policy disagreement with the Guideline 
even in a factually ordinary case.157 
 At the appellate level, post-Booker, all sentences are reviewed for 
reasonableness.158 Reasonableness review has been divided into two 
components: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonable-
ness.159 Procedural reasonableness review requires the appellate court 
                                                                                                                      
151 Id. 
152 See id. at 349–50. 
153 Id. at 350. 
154 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). 
155 Id. at 46 n.2; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007). 
156 552 U.S. at 109. 
157 See id. at 101 (“The Government acknowledges that the Guidelines are now advisory 
and that, as a general matter, courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on 
policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 
221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) (observing that Kimbrough “makes plain that a sentencing court 
can deviate from the guidelines based on general policy considerations”). 
158 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
159 See id. at 51; see also United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Our 
appellate review for reasonableness includes both a procedural component, encompassing 
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to confirm, among other things, that the district court properly calcu-
lated the Guideline range, responded to any non-frivolous arguments 
made for a non-Guideline sentence, and explained its sentencing deci-
sion.160 These last two requirements are important because they help to 
facilitate appellate review of the sentence, assure the defendant and 
public that the court seriously undertook its weighty responsibility, and 
provide feedback to the Commission so that it can review and revise its 
Guidelines.161 
 Once the appellate court has confirmed that the sentence is pro-
cedurally reasonable, it must determine whether the sentence is sub-
stantively reasonable—that is, whether the sentence is too long or too 
short in light of the goals of sentencing.162 Essentially, this inquiry re-
quires the appellate court to determine whether the district court 
abused its discretion in its balancing of the sentencing factors.163 In 
other contexts, the Court has equated the abuse of discretion standard 
with asking whether the district court followed “sound legal princi-
ples.”164 In short, post-Booker, district courts can no longer mechanically 
follow the Guidelines. They must instead listen to, and consider, policy 
challenges to the Guidelines themselves. 
B. The Prior Conviction Enhancement Is Unsound 
 Even measured against the forgiving standard of “reasonableness,” 
the prior conviction enhancements cannot pass muster. The deficien-
cies of the enhancements are not mere quibbles. Rather, their short-
comings infect almost every aspect of the conviction scheme. 
 One broad point deserves mentioning first, as it informs the entire 
discussion that follows. As explained above, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that Guidelines that fail to take into account empirical data and 
national experience do not provide useful advice to judges.165 Such a 
Guideline does “not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its charac-
teristic institutional role,”166 which can result in a “Guidelines sentence 
                                                                                                                      
the method by which a sentence was calculated, as well as a substantive component, which 
relates to the length of the resulting sentence.”). 
160 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
161 See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–58. 
162 See United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
163 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. 
164 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
165 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10. 
166 Id. 
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itself [that] fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.”167 This 
failing is readily apparent in the prior conviction enhancements in the 
illegal re-entry Guideline.168 Thus, the reasonableness of the Guideline 
provision must be viewed through a less deferential lens. 
 And through that lens, the discussion below examines the three 
primary deficiencies with the prior conviction enhancements in the 
illegal re-entry Guideline provision. First, this Part explores the fact that 
the Commission has never provided any justification for the prior con-
viction enhancement.169 Moreover, given the way the enhancements are 
structured, their existence seems to further no goal of sentencing. The 
Part next discusses the fact that the enhancement creates rather than 
avoids unwarranted disparities, contrary to one of the primary pur-
poses of the Guidelines.170 Finally, the Part contends that the en-
hancements are simply too harsh, even if the general idea of a prior 
conviction scheme could be justified.171 
 In short, the process by which the Commission crafted the illegal 
re-entry Guideline provision renders sentences that rely on the Guide-
line longer than necessary to serve the congressionally mandated goals 
of sentencing. Indeed, such a sentence will be unreasonably long. That 
is because the illegal re-entry Guideline is not a “sound legal princi-
ple[],” and thus district courts abuse their discretion when they rely on 
the Guideline provision to sentence a defendant.172 The sentence will 
not only be substantively unreasonable, but procedurally unreasonable 
as well, because there will not be a sufficient explanation in the record 
to justify the district court’s sentencing decision. The prior conviction 
enhancements, therefore, should not be followed, even in the typical 
case. 
                                                                                                                      
167 Rita, 551 U.S. at 351. 
168 See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 78, at 587 (noting that the Commission “clearly 
did not base its decision [to create the prior conviction enhancement] on research or 
expertise”); supra notes 13–53 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which the 
prior conviction enhancement was designed). This point is no less true in light of the stud-
ies the Commission did in 2001. The Commission’s research was aimed at nothing more 
than trying to redesign the prior conviction enhancement so that it resulted in a fairer 
distribution of offense level increases. See Maxfield, supra note 105, at 530–31. The re-
search was not aimed at justifying the enhancement to begin with. See id. 
169 See infra notes 173–183 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 224–253 and accompanying text. 
171 See infra notes 254–285 and accompanying text. 
172 Martin, 546 U.S. at 139 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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1. The Prior Conviction Enhancement Serves No Purpose 
 Perhaps the strongest indication that the prior conviction en-
hancement is unsound is the fact that the Commission has never articu-
lated a justification for it. Moreover, even the potential justifications for 
the enhancement—namely, deterrence and just desert based justifica-
tions—cannot support its use. Finally, to the extent that any other justi-
fication can support a prior conviction scheme in the abstract, none 
exist that can justify the Commission’s scheme. 
a. The Commission Never Provided a Justification for the Prior Conviction En-
hancement 
 When Congress increased the two-year statutory maximum for il-
legal re-entry in 1988—raising it to five or ten years for defendants with 
certain types of prior convictions173—it was perhaps not surprising that 
the Commission would seek to add offense characteristics for more se-
rious offenses. But what is most striking about how the Commission 
revised the Guideline is that it never once provided any justification for 
its decision to use a prior conviction enhancement scheme. It never, for 
example, articulated why someone with a certain type of prior convic-
tion commits a much more serious illegal re-entry than someone with-
out that prior conviction. Its troubling silence started in 1989, when it 
decided to add a four-level prior conviction enhancement for all prior 
felony convictions.174 Turning its back on the empirical evidence upon 
which the initial Guideline was based, the Commission fundamentally 
altered the way illegal re-entry defendants were sentenced without 
conducting a study or following any sort of historical precedent.175 
Later, in 1991, when the Commission installed the 16-level increase, it 
maintained its silence on why such enhancements were needed.176 In 
2001, when a flood of criticism forced the Commission to re-think what 
it had done, it merely altered the distribution of the types of convic-
tions that would receive the 16-level increase to bolster the chances that 
more serious types of prior convictions would qualify.177 It failed, how-
ever, to first ground its scheme in a theory of punishment. Thus, the 
Commission has never explained why any prior conviction should af-
                                                                                                                      
173 See Pub. L. 100-690, § 7345(a), 102 Stat. 4471 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326 (2006)). 
174 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 193 (1989). 
175 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
176 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 375 (1991). 
177 See Maxfield, supra note 105, at 530–32. 
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fect anything other than a defendant’s Criminal History Score, nor has 
it explained why illegal re-entry cases deserve to be singled out for spe-
cial treatment. The prior conviction enhancement scheme therefore 
currently has no announced purpose. 
 Three consequences flow from the fact that the Commission has 
never articulated any purpose for its prior conviction scheme. 
 First, it calls into question what the Commission was attempting to 
accomplish with the studies it performed in 2001. As outlined above, 
the Commission primarily rejected the time-served model because it 
was deemed too lenient on defendants.178 But an evaluation of whether 
any enhancement is too harsh or too lenient requires it to be compared 
to the purpose it is intended to serve.179 Without ever settling on a justi-
fication for its prior conviction enhancement scheme, the Commis-
sion’s conclusion that the time-served model was not harsh enough for 
enough defendants appears to be nothing more than a reflexive, sub-
jective opinion that more defendants should serve more time. Thus, far 
from helping to legitimize the enhancements, the Commission studies 
seem to undercut their legitimacy further. 
 A second consequence of the Commission’s failure to provide any 
justification for its enhancement scheme is that it makes it more diffi-
cult for district courts to evaluate whether applying the prior conviction 
enhancement effectively serves its intended purpose in any given case. 
In other words, district courts cannot effectively determine whether the 
goals of the enhancements are served in a particular case and, there-
fore, should or should not be followed because the Commission has 
not revealed its intended purpose. 
 Third, the lack of an articulated purpose for the prior conviction 
enhancement will typically render procedurally deficient any sentence 
that relies on the enhancement. In nearly any illegal re-entry sentenc-
ing, the district court will not explain why it believes the defendant’s 
prior conviction should so greatly increase the sentence length; rather, it 
will likely apply the prior conviction enhancement and then use the 
Guideline range, which will heavily depend on that enhancement, as its 
starting point in selecting the defendant’s sentence.180 Following such a 
                                                                                                                      
178 See id. at 535. 
179 As one commentator has explained: “The link between sentencing purposes and 
sentencing severity is relatively straightforward,” as any effort to determine whether a par-
ticular sentence is justified “presupposes some standard for evaluating what counts as a 
justified sentence.” Rappaport, supra note 13, at 1067. 
180 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (noting that the Guideline range “should be the starting 
point and the initial benchmark[]” in determining what sentence is appropriate). 
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procedure necessarily means, as the Supreme Court has noted, that the 
court “rest[ed] [its] decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning” 
that the enhancement is appropriate.181 In other words, the district 
court will adopt the Commission’s silence as its justification for applying 
the prior conviction enhancement. In those cases, therefore, the district 
court will have run afoul of the procedural requirement that it explain 
its sentencing decision, because the primary force behind its sentencing 
decision will be unexplained.182 Indeed, if a defendant committed any 
offense other than illegal re-entry and a district court decided to use its 
post-Booker discretion to increase a defendant’s offense level by 16 be-
cause the defendant had previously committed, say, burglary, without 
providing an explanation for why this action was appropriate, there 
would be no doubt that such a sentence would be procedurally unrea-
sonable.183 A sentence is no more reasonable when a district court relies 
on the Commission’s reasoning—thereby adopting its silence on a justi-
fication for the sentence’s length—and applies the prior conviction en-
hancement in an illegal re-entry case, because the record ultimately re-
mains barren of a justification for the sentencing decision. 
b. The Prior Conviction Scheme Cannot Be Justified on the Basis of “Deterrence” 
 Although the Commission did not articulate a reason for its prior 
conviction scheme, one potential justification that has intuitive appeal 
is general deterrence. That is, to the extent that we want to deter peo-
ple from other countries from entering the United States without per-
mission, we are particularly concerned about deterring those with an 
aggravated criminal background. Depending on the nature and age of 
a person’s prior conviction, it may indicate a risk to commit more 
crimes once in the United States. 
 Several problems plague this justification. First, as noted above, the 
Commission specifically designed chapter four’s Criminal History 
Score based in large part on validated measures of recidivism.184 Ac-
cording to the Commission, the criminal history rules generally work as 
intended and, if anything, may not take into account certain factors 
that predict reduced recidivism.185 Given that fact, to the extent that 
                                                                                                                      
181 Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. 
182 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
183 Cf. United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329–31 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding a sen-
tence was unreasonable because the district court had given a well-above Guideline sen-
tence without explanation). 
184 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 46, at 1. 
185 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 45, at 15. 
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the prior conviction enhancement scheme is designed to account for a 
deficiency in the criminal-history calculation, it would stand to reason 
that some sort of empirical data would be needed. But the Commission 
has never cited any evidence that giving defendants in illegal re-entry 
cases substantially longer sentences has any effect on deterring indi-
viduals from attempting to return to the United States.186 
 Moreover, even the Commission itself has expressed doubt about 
the usefulness of a prior conviction enhancement when prior convic-
tions are already accounted for in a defendant’s Criminal History 
Score.187 As noted above, in the context of eliminating a prior convic-
tion enhancement for alien smuggling cases, the Commission justified 
its decision to remove the enhancement in part by stating that such en-
hancements are “inconsistent” with the use of a Criminal History 
Score.188 The Commission’s skepticism is likely related to its admission 
elsewhere that “[t]here is no correlation between recidivism and Guide-
lines’ offense level” and “the guidelines’ offense level is not intended 
nor designed to predict recidivism.”189 
 Additionally, the prior conviction enhancements’ unsophisticated 
means of accounting for a defendant’s prior conviction seems poorly 
suited to account for concerns about recidivism. The enhancements 
never “time out.”190 No matter how dated the conviction is, the defen-
dant will receive the increase.191 But substantial empirical research has 
found a strong correlation between the freshness of a prior conviction 
and the likelihood a defendant will commit more crimes in the fu-
ture.192 That is why chapter four’s Criminal History Score does not 
                                                                                                                      
186 In fact, there is a wide body of literature that casts doubt on the relationship between 
sentence length and deterrence. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 
in 34 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 28 (Michael Tonry ed., 2006) (“Current 
knowledge concerning deterrence is little different than eighteenth-century theorists such as 
Beccaria . . . supposed it to be: certainty and promptness of punishment are more powerful 
deterrents than severity. . . . Imaginable increases in severity of punishments do not yield 
significant (if any) marginal deterrent effects.”); see also Amy Baron-Evans, Office of De-
fender Servs. Legal, Policy & Training Div., Sentencing by the Statute 7–9 (Apr. 27, 
2009), available at http://fd.org/pdf_lib/Sentencing_By_the_Statute.pdf (summarizing some 
of the literature). 
187 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 450 (1992). 
188 Id. at app. C, amend. 450. 
189 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 45, at 15. 
190 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii) (2009). 
191 United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The en-
hancement applies regardless of the time of conviction.” (citing U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines Manual § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(vii))). 
192 See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 Crime & 
Just. 303, 316–17 (1997). 
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count dated convictions, because they have no meaningful relationship 
to predicting a defendant’s future criminal conduct.193 Likewise, the 
much more modest prior conviction enhancements in the fire-
arms/explosives context can also time out.194 Additionally, the illegal 
re-entry prior conviction enhancements have not been tailored to en-
sure that defendants who are most likely to attempt to return illegally 
(or return illegally to commit more crimes) receive the highest offense 
level increase; rather, the enhancements appear to be set up to reflect 
the seriousness of the prior offense. 
 In sum, no empirical evidence supports the need for these convic-
tions on a deterrence rationale, and they are ill designed to address that 
concern. 
c. The Prior Conviction Scheme Cannot Be Justified on the Basis of “Just Deserts” 
 The poor fit between the prior conviction scheme and concerns 
about recidivism is perhaps why most courts that have tried to impute 
some sort of justification to the scheme have declined to do so on that 
basis. Rather, courts have tried to justify the scheme based on the idea 
that the enhancements were meant to increase a defendant’s sentence 
to reflect the seriousness of the current offense—what is known as the 
“just deserts” goal of sentencing.195 For example, the Ninth Circuit 
reached that conclusion, pointing out that the Seventh Circuit had ex-
plained (based on its own suppositions) that the prior conviction en-
hancements are “a measure of the seriousness of the crime committed, 
ratcheting up the sentence because it is a more serious offense to re-
turn after deportation when the defendant has previously committed a 
serious crime . . . .”196 
 But a bit of reflection reveals the lack of conceptual fit between the 
seriousness of illegally re-entering this country and the nature of the 
defendant’s criminal history. To begin with, the just deserts rationale 
                                                                                                                      
193 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1 cmt. nn.1–3 (excluding stale 
convictions from a defendant’s Criminal History Score). 
194 See id. § 2K1.3 cmt. n.2 (indicating that only prior convictions that score for pur-
poses of calculating a defendant’s Criminal History Score can qualify as triggering convic-
tions); id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10 (same). 
195 Rappaport, supra note 13, at 1058 (quoting the Senate report that accompanied the 
Sentencing Reform Act.) “Seriousness of the offense” is listed along with “promote respect 
for the law” and “provide just punishment for the offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
(2006). This cluster of purposes, as the legislative history indicates, is really just another 
way of articulating the “just deserts concept of punishment.” See Rappaport, supra note 13, 
at 1058 (quoting the Senate report that accompanied the Sentencing Reform Act). 
196 United States v. Gonzalez, 112 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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seeks to scale a defendant’s punishment to reflect the “gravity of the 
defendant’s conduct.”197 The gravity of a defendant’s conduct is typi-
cally measured “along two dimensions—the blameworthiness of the 
defendant’s mental state and the harm caused by the conduct.”198 The 
question thus becomes: does a defendant with certain prior convictions 
cause more harm or have a more culpable mental state than a defen-
dant who illegally enters the country without the same background? 
 It seems clear that a defendant does not cause additional harm 
when that defendant enters the United States with his prior convic-
tions.199 Indeed, because the prior conviction enhancements—unlike 
nearly every other offense characteristic—do not have anything to do 
with the way in which a defendant committed the present crime, it does 
not seem possible to link a defendant’s prior conviction to new harm 
caused. Rather, when the defendant illegally re-enters the United 
States, or enters and remains, that defendant causes the same amount 
of harm the defendant would have created if he or she had a prior con-
viction. The only way a defendant’s prior conviction can relate to caus-
ing harm—the argument that defendants with criminal histories are 
more likely to commit more crimes—is just a repackaging of the above-
discussed concerns about recidivism.200 
 Nor does a defendant necessarily appear to have a more culpable 
mental state for illegally re-entering if the defendant has an aggravated 
criminal background, especially if that aggravated background is for 
dated conduct or for non-immigration related offenses. 
 The awkward fit between a defendant’s prior convictions and the 
just desert theory has led most criminologists to deny that there is any 
relationship between the two at all.201 The relationship is “mysteri-
ous,”202 one criminologist writes, and another explains that “[a]ny reli-
                                                                                                                      
197 Rappaport, supra note 13, at 1064 (quoting the Senate report that accompanied the 
Sentencing Reform Act). 
198 Id. 
199 Cf. Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 Emory L.J. 557, 596 (2003) (observing that even a defender 
of a just desert theory who believes a defendant’s criminal history is generally relevant in 
assessing punishment “acknowledges that a prior criminal record is irrelevant for assessing 
the harm caused by the current offense”). 
200 See supra notes 184–194 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 199, at 595; Thomas Weigend, Sentencing in West 
Germany, 42 Md. L. Rev. 37, 88 n.265 (1983). 
202 Rappaport, supra note 199, at 595. 
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ance on an offender’s prior criminal record can only rest on predica-
tion rather than desert.”203 As one commentator has put it: 
[T]he just deserts model has little to offer in terms of how 
criminal history should be factored into the sentencing calcu-
lus because the notion just doesn’t fit the theory. Its “he 
should have known better this time” rationale for greater cul-
pability loses credibility when extended to prior crimes which 
are completely unrelated in nature or time to the current of-
fense.204 
In sum, “[p]opular conceptions of desert theories would appear to rule 
out the use of criminal history information, as the focus is on the of-
fense of conviction, and not previous criminal conduct.”205 
 Those criminologists that do support the idea that the just deserts 
theory can take into account prior convictions do so on the basis that 
such a theory must account for a defendant’s general character, and 
prior convictions are relevant in assessing a defendant’s character.206 
But this view fails to explain why a defendant should be punished twice 
for bad character; once when the defendant serves the original sen-
tence for the prior conviction and then again for the later crime. 
Moreover, this sort of theory (applied in illegal re-entry sentencing) 
implies that a defendant’s character should be the primary focus at sen-
tencing, which would require a much broader evaluation of a defen-
dant’s background than the Commission, and therefore the Guidelines, 
currently envision.207 The Commission has stated that “[m]ilitary, civic, 
charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; and 
similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining” 
whether a non-Guideline sentence is appropriate208—nor is “[l]ack of 
                                                                                                                      
203 Weigend, supra note 201, at 88 n.265; see also Roberts, supra note 192, at 311 (“[D]esert 
theorists see a clear distinction between crime seriousness and criminal history . . . .”). 
204 Barbara M. Vincent, So What’s the Purpose?, 9 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 189, 189 (1997). 
205 Roberts, supra note 192, at 317. 
206 See Rappaport, supra note 199, at 598–602. 
207 See id. at 600. 
208 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.11 (2009). This point aptly demon-
strates the bizarreness of the Commission’s sentencing philosophy in illegal re-entry cases. 
If a defendant has previously spent time in the U.S. military, the Commission expects the 
sentencing judge to turn a blind eye to that fact because it is irrelevant in an evaluation of 
the defendant. But if the defendant had previously committed a crime, that fact should be 
the driving force behind his sentence. It is perplexing, to say the least, to believe that one 
can accurately judge a person’s character by looking primarily at a person’s prior convic-
tion (no matter how dated or how trivial of a sentence he received for that prior convic-
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guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvan-
taged upbringing.”209 
 Taking into account a defendant’s general character in any signifi-
cant way would also seem to require a much more detailed look at the 
defendant’s past crime, including an evaluation of motive, because that 
would be key to an understanding of what the crime indicates about 
the defendant’s character. In short, it makes little sense for the Com-
mission to say that a defendant’s sentence should hinge primarily on a 
judgment about that defendant’s character and then to allow only the 
defendant’s criminal history onto the ledger, refusing to weigh any 
good works.210 
 Because of these general objections, this “character-based ap-
proach has failed to win wide acceptance as a justification for consider-
ing an offender’s criminal history.”211 As a result, many criminal theo-
rists believe that the “just desert theory cannot explain the major role 
that criminal history plays in modern sentencing schemes” and that 
concerns about recidivism are the real driving force behind relying on 
a defendant’s criminal history.212 
d. Even If a Justification Exists for a Prior Conviction Scheme in General, No 
Justification Exists for the Scheme the Commission Designed 
 Despite the lack of conceptual fit between the existence of prior 
convictions and the seriousness of a defendant’s current offense, there 
does seem to be widespread popular support for the idea that there is a 
relationship between the two.213 Opinion polls, for example, show that 
the public believes that a defendant who has committed a prior offense 
deserves to be punished more harshly if the defendant commits another 
offense, even apart from concerns about recidivism.214 Arguably, then, 
the courts and the Commission are justified in joining with the majority 
                                                                                                                      
tion) while at the same time ignoring a person’s selfless acts in risking his life to protect 
this country. 
209 Id. § 5H1.12. 
210 Of course, in Gall, the Supreme Court made it clear that district courts can and 
should take into account the circumstances of a defendant’s life in selecting a sentence. See 
552 U.S. at 50. But nowhere does the Court indicate that sentencing should be solely 
about the defendant’s character, nor does the Court indicate that such an evaluation of 
the defendant’s character should consist of reducing the defendant’s worth to a prior 
judgment of conviction. 
211 Rappaport, supra note 199, at 601. 
212 Id. at 602. 
213 See Roberts, supra note 192, at 311–13. 
214 See id. at 311–12. 
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view on this moral issue. Or perhaps there are other justifications that 
are more difficult to articulate for why we might want to punish some-
one more harshly for having committed a serious prior offense. 
 But even if there is a justification that would support some sort of 
prior conviction scheme, it could almost certainly not explain the prior 
conviction scheme that exists in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Any justification for 
the Commission’s scheme would have to explain why a prior conviction 
should play such a decisive role in a defendant’s sentence. Consider a 
defendant who illegally re-enters and is in Criminal History Category 
III. The defendant would face a Guideline range of two to eight 
months after pleading guilty.215 If one of those prior convictions was for 
burglary, however, the guideline range would explode to forty-six to 
fifty-seven months.216 The prior conviction is by far the most important 
ingredient in the Guideline calculation. Why the defendant tried to 
return, how many times the defendant had previously been deported, 
and prior immigration convictions incurred would be irrelevant. Even 
just desert theorists who believe criminal history should be considered 
believe that it should play only a “limited role” at sentencing.217 After 
all, if one is attempting to assess a defendant’s moral culpability in 
committing a crime, the focus should be on the facts of the defendant’s 
current crime. 
 Moreover, any justification for the Commission’s prior conviction 
scheme would have to explain why such a draconian scheme is justified 
only for illegal re-entry defendants and no other type of defendant. 
The just deserts theory, for example, does not seem to explain why ille-
gal re-entry cases should be treated differently.218 Conversely, if there is 
a penal theory that would justify harsh prior conviction enhancements, 
why not apply them at every federal sentencing? The fact that the 
Commission has refused to go down that path shows the enhance-
ment’s awkward fit with known penal theories. 
                                                                                                                      
215 The defendant would have a base offense level of 8. See U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines Manual § 2L1.2(a) (2009). The defendant would receive 2 levels off for accepting 
responsibility for the conduct. See id. § 3E1.1(a). That would result in an adjusted offense 
level of 6. If the defendant were in Criminal History Category III, the Guideline range 
would be two to eight months. 
216 The defendant would have a base offense level of 8. See id. § 2L1.2(a). The defen-
dant would then receive a 16-level increase for committing a crime of violence. See id. 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The defendant would receive 3 levels off for accepting responsibility 
for the conduct. See id. § 3E1.1(b). That would result in an adjusted offense level of 21. If 
the defendant were in Criminal History Category III, the Guideline range would be forty-
six to fifty-seven months. 
217 Roberts, supra note 192, at 318. 
218 See supra notes 195–212 and accompanying text. 
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 Indeed, judges have noted the peculiar fact that “‘[n]owhere but 
in the illegal re-entry Guidelines is a defendant’s offense level increased 
threefold based solely on a prior conviction.’”219 This point is impor-
tant, because nearly any hypothetical justification for a prior conviction 
enhancement scheme would struggle to provide normative support for 
treating illegal re-entry cases differently. What was the Commission 
thinking when it did so? 
 One potentially troubling implication is that class and race issues 
may have subconsciously infected the Commission’s decision-making 
process. Although these sorts of questions have been thoroughly dis-
cussed in the context of the Commission’s seemingly irrational decision 
to increase the Guideline range for crack-cocaine offenses,220 the same 
issues lurk around the Commission’s decision to increase so dramati-
cally the penalties for non-violent immigration offenses. Approximately 
eighty percent of immigration offenders never made it past high 
school.221 They are primarily Mexicans with few financial resources, and 
even though Hispanics constitute approximately thirteen percent of 
the total U.S. population, they account for approximately forty-three 
percent of federal offenders.222 The disproportionate impact of the 
harsh enhancements on a minority group without a reasoned justifica-
tion raises the specter that race and class issues have subconsciously 
seeped into the Commission’s thought process.223 The taint of irra-
tional prejudice certainly makes the Commission’s lack of articulated 
justification even more troubling. But regardless of what actually moti-
vated the Commission’s decision, it was an inexplicable one. 
 In sum, the Commission did not tailor its enhancement scheme to 
serve any purpose of sentencing. A district court relying on such a 
scheme to sentence a defendant has imposed a sentence that has not 
been justified and, in most cases, cannot be justified—in other words, a 
sentence that is substantively and procedurally unreasonable. 
                                                                                                                      
219 United States v. Carballo-Arguelles, 446 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(quoting United States v. Santos-Nuez, No. 05-CR-1232-RWS, 2006 WL 1409106, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006)). 
220 See, e.g., Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 
Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,075–77(1995); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 
Stan L. Rev. 1283, 1289–98 (1995). 
221 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 102, at tbl.46. 
222 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 101, at 5. 
223 Cf. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 784 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (discussing the 
subconscious prejudice that might have infected the thought process behind the 100-to-1, 
crack to powder ratio), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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2. The Commission’s Prior Conviction Scheme Fosters Unwarranted 
Sentencing Disparity 
 Not only does the illegal re-entry Guideline stand on shaky theo-
retical ground, it undermines the primary purpose of the Guidelines: to 
reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity.224 As explained above, one of 
the fundamental building blocks of the Guidelines was the idea of a real-
offense system.225 That is, defendants were to be punished based on 
their actual conduct in the offense of conviction.226 A pure charged-
based system was repudiated because of its tendency to view all conduct 
under the broad umbrella of a particular crime to be the same, despite 
the fact that a wide range of conduct could fall under any given criminal 
statute.227 The charge-based system, for example, would be unable to 
differentiate between a bank robbery in which a gun was used to beat a 
teller in the course of stealing a large amount of money and a bank 
robbery in which no one was hurt, no weapon was used, and only a 
                                                                                                                      
224 Even apart from the prior conviction enhancements, sentencing in illegal re-entry 
cases already has serious problems furthering the goal of reducing unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparity because of the fast-track program, which allows defendants in some districts, 
but not others, to receive an extra sentence reduction if they quickly plead guilty. “By cre-
ating a situation where the severity of the sentence depends only upon place of arrest, the 
fast-track program promotes disparity in sentencing.” Erin T. Middleton, Fast-Track to Dis-
parity: How Federal Sentencing Policies Along the Southwest Border are Undermining the Sentencing 
Guidelines and Violating Equal Protection, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 827, 828 (discussing the dispar-
ity caused by the fast-track program). The courts of appeals are currently split over 
whether district courts may mitigate the disparity cased by the fast-track program now that 
the Guidelines are advisory. See Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Dispar-
ity: Rereading Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 488 
(2010) (documenting that the First and Third Circuits allow district courts to use their 
post-Booker discretion to mitigate the effects of the fast-track program, whereas the Fifth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits do not.) The circuits that do not allow district courts to take 
into account fast-track disparity do so on the basis that “Congress explicitly authorized 
downward sentencing departures for fast-track programs . . . .” United States v. Gonzalez-
Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 739 (9th. Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 83 (2009). This, despite the fact 
that the Supreme Court, in Kimbough, authorized district courts to disagree with the Guide-
line that authorized the 100-to-1 crack to powder cocaine ratio, which is a ratio Congress 
had implicitly improved of when it created that ratio in its drafting of the minimum man-
datory penalties for crack cases. See 552 U.S. at 101–08. In other words, the circuits that 
have held that district courts may not mitigate disparity caused by the fast-track program 
have drawn a distinction between Guidelines that have been explicitly approved of by 
Congress and those that have been, at best, approved of implicitly. The disparity caused by 
the fast-track program, however, is beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, because the 
prior conviction enhancements are, at best, only implicitly approved of by Congress, the 
line of cases discussing fast-track disparity are inapplicable to policy attacks on the en-
hancements. 
225 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
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small amount of money was taken.228 Although both defendants com-
mitted “bank robbery,” one was clearly more culpable than the other. 
The benefit of a real-offense system is that it can account for that nu-
ance, thereby ensuring that those defendants are not treated similarly. 
 The prior conviction enhancements, however, breathe new life 
into a pure charge-offense system, burying all elements of a real-offense 
system for purposes of illegal re-entry convictions.229 The scheme treats 
broad classes of crimes the same way. Thus, the bank robbers in the 
above example would both receive the same enhancement if they were 
later convicted of illegal re-entry. The facts of their particular cases are 
irrelevant. Once it is determined that the defendant’s prior conviction 
falls under one of several generic labels, the defendant receives the en-
hancement.230 
 The way in which the Commission treats a prior drug trafficking 
offense illustrates the problem.231 In one way, the drug-trafficking of-
fense enhancement is more sophisticated and allows for a more nu-
anced determination than most of the other prior conviction enhance-
ments. That is because—unlike the other prior conviction enhance-
ments in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2—the drug trafficking guideline tethers the 
offense level increase, in one small way, to a specific fact in the defen-
dant’s prior conviction.232 Defendants who served less than thirteen 
months for their “drug trafficking offense” receive the 12-level increase, 
whereas defendants who served thirteen months or more receive the 16-
level increase.233 The enhancement thus attempts to differentiate be-
tween serious drug trafficking offenses and less serious ones.234 But that 
is where the individualized determination ends. The prior conviction 
enhancement does not account for the identity of the drug, the drug 
amount, or the defendant’s role in the trafficking.235 Each of these 
characteristics, however, is key to the Guideline calculation for a defen-
dant who is federally prosecuted for a drug-trafficking offense.236 For 
example, a defendant who pled guilty to being a courier of 50 kilograms 
                                                                                                                      
228 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
229 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § L1.2 (2009). 
230 See id. 
231 See id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), (B). 
232 See id. 
233 Id. 
234 See id. 
235 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), (B) (2009). 
236 See id. § 2D1.1 (providing the offense level for drug offenses, which is dependent 
on drug type and amount); id. § 3B1.2 (providing for an offense level reduction if the 
defendant played a minor or minimal role in his offense). 
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of marijuana would face a Guideline range of 18 to 24 months if the de-
fendant had no criminal history,237 whereas a defendant with some 
criminal history who pled guilty to conspiring to deal over 30 kilograms 
of heroin would face a Guideline range of 235 to 293 months.238 The 
first defendant would likely get about a year and a half; the second 
would be looking at twenty to twenty-five years. If the defendants in 
these cases are later prosecuted for illegal re-entry, however, both will 
receive the same 16-level increase.239 It is difficult to see how such a re-
sult is justifiable under a system that claims to tether the defendant’s 
sentence to actual conduct. 
 The prior conviction enhancements foster unwarranted disparity in 
another way. In addition to using the charge-based system, the en-
hancement scheme does so in a particularly irrational way. Not only are 
certain classes of crimes treated the same way, but different classes of 
crimes are treated the same way. Terrorists, murderers, rapists, and child 
molesters receive the same steep 16-level enhancement as a defendant 
who committed extortion by saying, “Give me $10 or I’ll key your car,”240 
as a defendant who committed statutory rape when, as an 18-year old, 
he had consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend;241 as a defendant 
who committed an assault when he threw a rock at a car that had at-
tempted to run him over during a dispute about a Sony Discman;242 and 
as a defendant who committed arson by causing $35 worth of damage to 
a car by throwing a lit match at it.243 Likewise, defendants who commit a 
crime involving the use or attempted use of physical force against an-
other would receive the same 16-level increase as a defendant who just 
                                                                                                                      
237 The defendant’s base offense level would be 20. See id. § 2D1.1. The defendant 
would likely receive two levels off for being a minor participant in the marijuana sale. See 
id. § 3B1.2(b). Finally, the defendant would receive three levels off for pleading guilty and 
accepting responsibility for the conduct. See id. § 3E1.1(b). That would result in an ad-
justed offense level of 15. Since the defendant would be in Criminal History Category I, 
the guideline range would be eighteen to twenty-four months. 
238 The defendant’s base offense level would be 38. See id. § 2D1.1. The defendant 
would likely receive three levels off for pleading guilty and accepting responsibility for the 
conduct. See id. § 3E1.1(b). That would result in an adjusted offense level of 35. If the de-
fendant were in Criminal History Category IV, the Guideline range would be 235–293 
months. 
239 See id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). 
240 United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. 
Ct. 959 (2009). 
241 See United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, 449 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (10th Cir. 2006). 
242 See United States v. Perez-Nunez, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1266–67 (D.N.M. 2005). 
243 See United States v. Trujill-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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made a threat to use physical force.244 The results are equally inexplica-
ble with respect to the 8-level increase.245 Conduct that can result in the 
8-level increase can vary from shoplifting to attempted manslaughter.246 
Treating these defendants similarly does not avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities—it requires unwarranted disparities.247 
 Moreover, even defendants who commit precisely the same act do 
not necessarily receive the same enhancement, because many states 
have broadly defined crimes that do not fit under the generic defini-
tion provided in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.248 To cite just one of the many exam-
ples, a defendant who was previously convicted of kidnapping will not 
necessarily receive the 16-level enhancement if the defendant had been 
convicted in California or Colorado, but will receive the enhancement 
if convicted in New York.249 Likewise, a defendant who commits bur-
glary in Arkansas will receive the 16-level enhancement, but not if the 
                                                                                                                      
244 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); id. § 2L1.2 cmt. 
n.1(B)(iii). 
245 See id. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). 
246 See United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
904 (2009) (holding that New York’s manslaughter law did not qualify for the 16-level in-
crease but would presumably qualify as an aggravated felony, triggering the 8-level in-
crease); United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
defendant’s prior conviction for shoplifting in Massachusetts qualified as an aggravated 
felony, which at that point in time triggered the 16-level increase, but would now trigger 
the 8-level increase). 
247 Many district courts have already recognized this particular arbitrary aspect of the 
illegal re-entry Guideline provision; as one such judge recently commented: 
[A] relatively minor drug offense might result in a sentence exceeding 13 
months, automatically resulting in a 16-level enhancement under 2L1.2. Whereas 
a prior conviction for embezzlement, fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, in-
voluntary servitude, obstruction of justice, perjury or bribery would result in an 
eight-level enhancement. Obviously, in a particular case any one of these crimes 
could be much more serious than that of, say, selling a few hundred dollars’ 
worth of cocaine. But the Guideline does not recognize any such possibility. 
When viewing it in that fashion, one must conclude that 2L1.2 is arbitrary and 
capricious, and in many cases will produce a result that is simply not reasonable. 
Memorandum Sentencing Opinion at 7, United States v. Salazar-Pacheco, No. 6:05-CR-137-
ORL-31KRS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2006). 
248 This wrinkle is due to the complexities of the categorical approach, whereby courts 
determine the generic definition of the crime in the Guidelines and then determine whether 
the elements of the crime the defendant committed falls under that generic definition. See, 
e.g., United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1189–97 (9th Cir. 2009) (following the approach 
set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). 
249 See United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 448–57 (5th Cir. 2008) (discuss-
ing California kidnapping); United States v. Cervantes-Blanco, 504 F.3d 576, 578–87 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (discussing Colorado kidnapping); United States v. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790, 
792 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing New York kidnapping). 
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defendant committed the burglary in California.250 An even more in-
explicable result occurs with respect to defendants who previously 
committed simple assault.251 Such a conviction will result in a 16-level 
increase in a later illegal re-entry prosecution if the assault took place 
in one of four states; it will not result in a 16-level increase if the convic-
tion occurred in any of the other forty-six states.252 Observing this fact, 
one judge commented that “[i]t is difficult to see how the Guidelines 
promote uniformity in sentencing under this scheme.”253 That conclu-
sion seems inescapable. 
 The illegal re-entry Guideline provision lulls district courts into a 
false sense of security regarding the uniformity of their sentences. The 
Guidelines, in effect, act as a security blanket, stunting the develop-
ment of a culture where like cases are truly treated alike—the faulty 
assumption that a guideline sentence avoids the problem of unwar-
ranted disparity replaces analysis, thought, and judgment regarding 
what sort of sentence would facilitate proportionality. 
3. Use of the Enhancement Results in Disproportionate Punishments 
 Aside from concerns that the prior conviction enhancements have 
not been tailored to serve any of the goals of sentencing and foster un-
warranted sentencing disparities, the enhancements are simply too 
harsh. This is especially so for the 8-, 12-, and 16-level enhancements, 
which dramatically increase sentences, resulting in defendants serving 
over three years for doing nothing more than illegally re-entering the 
country.254 Even if the Commission could offer some justification for 
increasing a defendant’s sentence in an illegal re-entry case for a prior 
conviction beyond what chapter four would recommend, there is no 
justification for the large increases found in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 
 To put in perspective the severity of the 16-level increase, a defen-
dant must cause over a million dollars of loss in a fraud case before that 
defendant’s offense level climbs by a similar amount.255 Likewise, a de-
                                                                                                                      
250 See United States v. Aguila-Montes, 553 F.3d 1229, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that California burglary does not constitute generic burglary); United States v. Mendoza-
Sanchez, 456 F.3d 479, 481–83 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that Arkansas burglary constitutes 
generic burglary); see also United States v. Carbajal-Diaz, 508 F.3d 804, 807–13 (5th Cir. 
2007) (holding that Missouri burglary constitutes generic burglary under the modified 
categorical approach). 
251 See Perez-Nunez, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. 
252 See id. 
253 Id. 
254 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), (B), (C) (2009). 
255 See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). 
762 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:719 
fendant in a price-fixing scheme must have affected $1.5 billion worth 
of commerce before receiving a 16-level increase.256 Looked at another 
way, a defendant convicted of illegal re-entry who receives the 16-level 
increase will have an offense level of 24, which is on par with a defen-
dant who threatened national security by using explosives to destroy an 
airport or an airplane,257 transmitting national defense information,258 
or by tampering with restricted data concerning atomic energy.259 Simi-
larly, defendants who receive the 16-level increase will have a compara-
ble offense level to defendants who committed such crimes as the sex 
trafficking of children,260 sexually abusing a minor under the age of 
sixteen,261 reckless manslaughter,262 being involved in the slave trade,263 
and inciting a prison riot with a substantial risk of death.264 A defendant 
who receives the 8-level increase will have an offense level equal to 
someone who has distributed between ten and twenty grams of her-
oin;265 distributed obscene material to a minor;266 obstructed justice;267 
or gave less than twenty-five pounds of explosive material to a known 
felon.268 
 Perhaps the most idiosyncratic aspect of the punishment structure 
of section 2L1.2—and the clearest example of its tendency to over-
punish—is the fact that it typically results in a defendant serving more 
time in federal prison because of the prior conviction than the defen-
dant originally did for the prior offense. A particularly egregious ex-
ample of this phenomenon is seen in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit’s 2005 decision, United States v. Gonzalez-Coronado, where 
the defendant received the 16-level increase even though the triggering 
prior conviction had resulted in no prison time.269 Such results are in-
defensible, but unfortunately all too typical.270 Indeed, it is entirely in-
                                                                                                                      
256 See id. § 2R1.1(b)(2)(H). 
257 See id. § 2K1.4(a)(1). 
258 See id. § 2M3.3(a)(2). 
259 See id. § 2M3.5(a). 
260 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(a)(4) (offense level 24). 
261 See id. § 2A3.2(a) (offense level 18). 
262 See id. § 2A1.4 (offense level 18). 
263 See id. § 2H4.1(a)(1) (base offense level 22). 
264 See id. § 2P1.3(a)(1) (offense level 22). 
265 See id. § 2D1.1(c)(12) (offense level 16). 
266 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G3.1(b)(1)(C) (offense level 15). 
267 See id. § 2J1.2(a) (offense level 14). 
268 See id. § 2K1.3(a)(4) (offense level 16). 
269 See 419 F.3d 1090, 1094–95 (10th Cir. 2005). 
270 See, e.g., Perez-Nunez, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1266, 1267 (including the 16-level enhance-
ment in the calculation of a defendant’s offense level for a Colorado assault conviction 
that netted him twenty-four days in state jail). 
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explicable that federal judges regularly sentence defendants to more 
time for a state offense—where they often know almost nothing about 
the prior offense other than the name of the statute of conviction and 
perhaps a one or two sentence explanation of the crime—than the 
judge who sentenced the defendant in state court and presumably was 
intimately familiar with the facts of the offense. 
 Another idiosyncratic aspect of the enhancement that results in 
excessively long sentences is the fact that the triggering prior conviction 
can be ancient, as there is no time limitation built into the enhance-
ment. A recent example is seen in United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, de-
cided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2009, where 
the defendant had lived in the United States for almost fifty years, hav-
ing been brought to the United States in 1957, when he was two years 
old.271 The defendant was eventually deported in 2006 and returned to 
the United States two weeks later.272 He was apprehended at the border 
and quickly pled guilty to illegal re-entry.273 Given that he was in Crimi-
nal History Category II, his Guideline range was forty-six to fifty-seven 
months—a range driven by a 1981 conviction for assault with great bod-
ily injury and attempted voluntary manslaughter, which qualified for 
the 16-level increase.274 Despite the fact that the Guideline range was 
driven by a twenty-five-year-old prior conviction, the district court se-
lected a mid-Guideline range sentence of fifty-two months.275 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the sentence was substan-
tively unreasonable, one of the few cases reaching such a result.276 In 
reversing, the court took on the policy behind the prior conviction en-
hancement directly, stating that it was unreasonable to increase “a de-
fendant’s sentence by the same magnitude irrespective of the age of the 
prior conviction at the time of re-entry.”277 The Ninth Circuit stated 
that the present offense was less serious than re-entry soon after com-
mitting a serious crime and that the guideline sentence did not avoid 
                                                                                                                      
271 See 567 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. at 1053. 
276 See id. at 1058. This fact prompted an attempt by some Ninth Circuit judges to have 
the case taken en banc. See United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 586 F.3d 1176, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc). 
277 Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d at 1055 (emphasis omitted). The court continued: “Al-
though it may be reasonable to take some account of an aggravated felony, no matter how 
stale, in assessing the seriousness of an unlawful reentry into the country, it does not follow 
that it is inevitably reasonable to assume that a decades-old prior conviction is deserving of 
the same severe additional punishment as a recent one.” Id. at 1055–56. 
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unwarranted similarities among differently situated offenders.278 It was 
not reasonable for the defendant’s record of harmlessness to others for 
the past twenty-five years to subject him to the same severe enhance-
ment applied to a recent violent offender.279 The decision is encourag-
ing, giving the green light to other reasonableness attacks to stale prior 
convictions. Indeed, this case provides a good template for attacking all 
aspects of the prior conviction enhancement in the district court and 
on appeal. 
 Judges across the political spectrum have spoken out against the 
harsh, unjust results mandated in illegal re-entry cases. For example, 
Judge Gregory Presnell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida recently testified in front of the Commission that the 
prior conviction enhancement scheme for illegal re-entry cases has re-
sulted in “grossly unjust results.”280 Former district court judge Paul 
Cassell, generally a defender of the Guidelines, has singled out the 
Guideline provisions for immigration offenses as those that “are quite 
often too high.”281 Indeed, a number of district court judges now rec-
ognize the endemic problems with U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.282 
 In sum, the prior conviction enhancements punish people too 
harshly for doing no more than entering the United States without 
permission after having been deported. Even the Commission itself has 
recognized the relatively minor nature of the offense of illegal re-entry, 
by assigning the crime a base offense level of only 8.283 That relatively 
minor crime should generally not be punished harshly. Moreover, the 
typical profile of a defendant convicted of illegal re-entry is not some-
one deserving of a steep penalty. As one district court judge explained 
during her testimony to the Commission: 
                                                                                                                      
278 Id. at 1056. 
279 See id. 
280 Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Atlanta, Ga., U.S. Sentencing 
Commission 133 (Feb. 11, 2009) (testimony of Judge Gregory Presnell). 
281 Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique 
of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017, 1019 (2004). 
282 See, e.g., Carballo-Arguelles, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 745; Santos-Nuez, 2006 WL 1409106, at 
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F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1025–27 (D. Neb. 2005). 
283 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(a) (2009). 
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[Illegal re-entry defendants] are not terrorists, and the vast 
majority of them are not violent criminals. Overwhelmingly, 
they are motivated by poverty to come to the United States to 
work. They come from Mexico or Central American countries 
to support their families or to reunite with family members 
who are already in the United States.284 
With few exceptions, sending those people to prison for more than two 
years is disproportionate to the crime they have committed.285 That is, it 
is unreasonable. 
Conclusion 
 It has now been more than a decade since Mr. Almendarez-Torres 
was sentenced to prison for over seven years for illegal re-entry. The 
time is long past due for meaningful reflection on whether that sort of 
sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 
Does it really make sense to imprison a former burglar for over seven 
years because he made the poor decision to come back to the United 
States after having been deported? Was the $175,000 we spent housing 
him over that time money well spent?286 
 The prior conviction enhancement has now been a part of the il-
legal re-entry sentencing landscape for over twenty years. During that 
time, the Commission has continually tinkered with the enhancement, 
ultimately reaching the complicated scheme that exists today. Despite 
the unique nature of the prior conviction enhancements, there has 
been surprisingly little discussion, especially among judges, about 
whether the enhancements are necessary to assure that sentences in 
illegal re-entry cases properly reflect the congressionally mandated 
goals of sentencing. 
 A large part of the problem can be traced to the fact that the 
Guidelines were mandatory for so long. Under a mandatory regime, 
                                                                                                                      
284 2006 Hearing, supra note 129, at 33 (testimony of Chief Judge Martha Vazquez, Dist. 
of N.M.). 
285 That is not to say that certain illegal re-entry defendants do not deserve harsh pen-
alties, approaching the twenty-year statutory maximum. For example, a defendant who 
harms law enforcement or others in the course of illegally re-entering—or who illegally re-
enters to commit a serious offense—would warrant a long sentence. 
286 See Memorandum from Matthew Rowland, Deputy Assistant Dir., Admin. Office of 
the U.S. Courts to Chief Prob. Officers & Chief Pretrial Servs. Officers, Cost of Incarcera-
tion and Supervision 1 (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.dcfpd.org/library/cost.pdf 
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district courts were forbidden from questioning the policy behind any 
given Guideline provision—and from questioning whether there was 
any policy behind it at all. Thus, for close to twenty years, judges be-
came accustomed to the idea that defendants in illegal re-entry cases 
could receive an enhancement based on the nature of their prior con-
victions. But now that the Guidelines are advisory, courts should be ask-
ing very serious questions about whether this regime makes any sense. 
As this Article shows, it does not. So, what to do about it? 
 The Commission, of course, is the body that could most easily fix 
the broken enhancement scheme. It has the ability—and the obliga-
tion—to determine what kind of enhancement system makes the most 
sense. So far, the Commission has not acted, even though many of the 
flaws catalogued above have been pointed out at public hearings.287 
 Until the Commission acts, district court judges, as the front-line 
sentencing actors, are in the best position to mend the system. Some 
district court judges, in fact, have occasionally recognized the problems 
with the prior conviction enhancements in particularly egregious cases 
and have used their post-Booker discretion to eliminate the injustice. But 
even those judges cannot quite escape the grip of this prior conviction-
enhancement regime, as they still often give the enhancements some 
credence when they deserve none (or, at least, very little). Indeed, 
courts should free themselves from the shackles of the prior conviction 
enhancements entirely. A defendant’s prior convictions in an illegal re-
entry case should be treated like the defendant’s prior convictions in 
any other case: they should be accounted for in the defendant’s Crimi-
nal History Score. And if that score “under-represents” the defendant’s 
criminal history, the court should upwardly depart, as it would in any 
other case.288 
 The obligation to ensure defendants receive fair sentences should 
not fall entirely on the Commission and courts. Defense counsel should 
present arguments against the prior conviction scheme to district 
courts, thereby arming the courts with reasons a below-Guideline sen-
tence is warranted. By challenging the soundness of the Guideline 
                                                                                                                      
287 See, e.g., 2006 Hearing, supra note 129, at 22 (testimony of Comm’r Ruben Castillo) 
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range itself, defense counsel will trigger the district court’s heightened 
obligation to respond to a defendant’s non-frivolous argument for a 
below-Guideline sentence.289 
 All that said, there is something a bit uncomfortable about advo-
cating for the wholesale rejection of an entire Guideline provision. 
Such a position risks a return to pre-Guideline sentencing, when dis-
trict courts were armed with wide discretion and little direction. More-
over, district court judges are not in a great position to craft sentencing 
policy for a broad range of defendants. Indeed, that is why Congress 
created a sentencing commission and established a mandatory Guide-
line regime. But in this post-Booker world, district court judges are statu-
torily required to give sentences that are sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to satisfy the goals of sentencing, and they may not impose 
an unreasonable sentence. Guideline provisions that are rotten 
through and through—like the prior conviction enhancement—can no 
longer be followed. As one district court judge put it, “The Court’s invi-
tation [in Kimbrough] . . . to critique the Guidelines . . . represents an 
opportunity for district courts to participate in the creation of a fairer 
system of federal sentencing.”290 This is especially so when there is no 
evidence that the Commission relied on its institutional expertise in 
amending a Guideline. It also seems perverse for a district court judge 
to refuse to toss out a broken system because the system is more effec-
                                                                                                                      
289 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–58 (2007). As the Court said in Rita: 
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tively remedied by someone else. Although district courts’ ad hoc re-
sponses are surely a second-best solution to the vexing problem of ille-
gal re-entry sentencing, an even worse solution is to maintain the status 
quo in the hopes that a system-wide fix will occur. As long as the Com-
mission refuses to promulgate an illegal re-entry Guideline provision 
that is justified, courts should be unwilling to respect a regime that re-
sults in unjust, unjustified, and unreasonable sentences. 
